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GETTING A GOOD BUY WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM
A FRIEND: TURNING TO THE UNITED STATES TO
GO FORWARD WITH AUSTRALIAN TAKEOVERS
REGULATION
Jam es McConvill*
ABSTRACT

Australia has always turned to the United States for guidance and
inspiration. We appreciate U.S. fashion, take a strong interest in U.S.
politics, and are heavy consumers of U.S. film, television shows and
music. But in relation to U.S. corporate regulation and corporate law
scholarship, Australia is decidedly slow on the uptake. It would be
wrong to suggest that Australia does not follow what is going on in the
U.S. corporate law arena, particularly since the collapse of Enron and
WorldCom, but it hasn't excited us. Like much that comes out of the
U.S., the great nation of liberty's corporate law scholarship and
approach to corporate regulation can generally be described as
brilliant.
In this article, I tap into this brilliance in an attempt to unlock the
hidden genius of Australian takeovers law. It is argued that the
regulation of Australia's market of corporate control can be made more
efficient not through the conventional process of law reform, but rather
through a fresh approach to corporate regulation (and more
specifically takeovers regulation) involving the application ofprinciples
of marketing and product design. A trip to the other side of the world
reveals a lot about Australian takeovers law that most observers do not
appreciate. It is well worth the plane ticket.
Re-examining Australian takeovers regulation through a U.S. lens
is not of mere academic interest. Nor is it merely a topic of interest to
Australians. In fact, Australia has the strongest takeovers market in the
Asia-Pacific region (excluding Japan), and has one of the most active
The Australia-US. Free Trade
takeovers market in the world.
Agreement, which came into effect at the beginning of 2005, also makes
it a lot easier for U.S. corporations to invest in Australia, making
Australia a more attractive opportunity for U.S. investors. It is
therefore important that Australian takeovers law, an important product
in the market for corporate control in Australia, is designed so as to be
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as efficient as possible.
This article is about effective product management of Australian
takeovers regulation, drawing upon ideas and thinking in the U.S., to
make it a more attractive product going forward.
In this article, I explain how a mix of U.S. ingenuity and Australian
vision can achieve greater freedom for participants in Australia's
market for corporate control.
INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Article

The idea behind this article is to unlock the hidden "genius" of
Australian takeovers law. 1 This is to be achieved not by way of
legislative reform, but rather by taking a fresh look at the law which
already exists, in light of the structure of U.S. takeovers law and
innovation in U.S. corporate law scholarship, along with the use of
principles and concepts in marketing.
It will draw upon the U.S. economic analysis of law and corporate
law; more specifically, treating law as a product in a market.
Accordingly, this makes it useful to draw upon principles of marketing
to make the product more effective in responding to consumer demand.
This article will adopt a "product management approach" to
takeovers law, seeking guidance from the U.S. to make the product
more efficient, in order to respond to consumer demand and thus to
justify the continued existence of this product in the market. In doing
so, it will look to the regulation of takeovers in the U.S., a system which
has similar objectives to Australian takeovers regulation but which is
more streamlined, despite operating in a more sophisticated and active
market for corporate control.
The approach of this article has strong parallels with a famous
statement of former U.S. President John F. Kennedy, "[c]itizens of the
world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can
do for the freedom of man. " 2 This article is about how applying
American thought and practice to the existing structure of Australian
takeover law will provide for greater freedom, and overall greater
efficiency in the operation of Australian takeovers regulation.

1. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (in using the
word "genius" the author draws inspiration from Roberta Romano's famous monograph).
2. U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), available at
http://www.hpol.org/jfk/inaugural (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
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Learningfrom the United States: It Must Be Doing Something Right
As Tom Cruise's character said in Jerry Maguire, "America sets
the tone for the world."3 Notwithstanding recent talk of a slippage in
U.S. dominance and influence, there are factors which will ensure that
the U.S. sets the tone for a long time to come.
It makes sense for this article to focus on the U.S. The U.S. has the
largest economy in the world; indeed over one fifth of the world's gross
domestic product (GDP) occurs in the U.S. 4 More specifically, the U.S.
is also home to the largest and most successful corporations in the
world, and also has a very healthy mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
market. Part I of this article will look at the statistics that confirm the
dominance of the U.S.
Thus, as a producer of corporate law, the U.S. is a successful
operator. Australia, in developing its product for offer in an emerging
region for M&A activity, could do a lot worse than tum to the U.S. for
guidance in relation to corporate regulation, and takeovers law in
general. It is time for Australia and its corporate regulator, the
Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC), to be inspired
and get excited about corporate regulation.
The Global Importance ofAustralia's Market for Corporate Control
This article is not simply about focusing on the takeover rules of a
jurisdiction that is a nice place for a holiday, but does not really have
much practical importance. While I understand as well as anybody that
it is useful to know about what is going on in another jurisdiction,
pragmatism dictates that one's time is better spent learning more about
the rules in one's home jurisdiction.
But this is not the case in relation to Australian takeovers law.
Australia is the busiest M&A market in the Asia-Pacific region
(excluding Japan), and rates highly in international foreign direct
investment (FDI) confidence surveys. Americans are the biggest
investors in Australia, and this trend is only going to continue due to the
recently-enacted free trade agreement, which (among other things)
liberalizes foreign investment rules between the two countries. In terms
of M&A, more American eyes will inevitably tum to Australia.
Below is a summary of some useful recent statistics on Australia.

3. Jerry Maguire (Tri-Star Pictures 1996).
4. Yahoo!, World Factbook: GDP Statistics Country Comparison Table,
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/factbook/countrycompare/gdp/la.html;_y It=AouSSu4
KOUTuwbu2jBYLFNLGecYF (last visited Dec. 7, 2006).
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Australian Economy

Australia is the fourth largest economy in the Asia-Pacific, and the
fourteenth largest in the world. According to the World Competitive
Yearbook, Australia has the third lowest level of political instability in
the world. Furthermore, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit,
Australia is the sixth best place to live in the world: the only nonEuropean country in the top ten. 5
Australia's M&A Market

According to the KPMG Corporate Finance survey of the
Australian takeovers market for 2004 and 2005, Australia is one of the
top three active M&A markets in the world, and the largest in the AsiaPacific region, excluding Japan. Furthermore, according to the KPMG
survey, Australia is currently experiencing an aggressive M&A market.
From 2004 to June 2005, M&A activity was up 55%. 6
Australia is home to approximately 4% of the worldwide M&A
market. According to KPMG, in 2005, $27 billion (USD) worth of
deals were done in Australia, out of $671 billion (USD) worth of deals
worldwide.
In a paper published in 2002, M&A lawyer Justin Mannolini
explained that, "[a] stable political system, independent judiciary,
reliable money supply and recognition and protection of property rights
are all critical" - making Australia a potentially important M&A
destination, even though it "has an extremely small capital base by
world standards."7
Foreign Direct Investment in Australia

According to A.T. Kearney's 2004 FDI Confidence Index survey,
Australia ranked as the "seventh most attractive destination in the world

5. AMERICAN AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATION, US - AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
http://www.americanaustralian.org/Services/storyprint.php?storyld=2028&type=story (last
visited Nov. 28, 2006).
6. Note, however, that according to the December 2005 edition of Australia's
Corporate Law Electronic Bulletin: "The value of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in
Australia dropped by 19 percent in 2005 compared to the same period in 2004, according to
research by KPMGs Corporate Finance practice published on 5 December 2005. While the
number of deals rose slightly from 612 in the first 11 months of 2004 to 651 in the first 11
months of 2005, the value of deals fell substantially from $61 billion to $49 billion over the
same time frame."
CORPORATE LAW ELECTRONIC BULLETIN, available at
http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/corporate-law-bulletin/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
7. See Justin Mannolini, Convergence or Divergence: Is There a Role for the Eggleston
Principles in a Global M&A Environment?, 24 SYDNEY. L.REv. 336, 342 (2002).
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for foreign direct investment." 8 American and British investors
accounted for more than half of the FDI investment in Australia. 9
On its website, the American Australian Association provides
statistics that confirm that "[t]he U.S. is Australia's largest source of
foreign direct investment, with assets of $53 billion held by American
investors." 10
According to the American Australian Association, U.S. direct
investment into Australia is likely to increase due to the Australia "American
United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA).
investment in Australia will be made easier with the FTA. Most
investments will be exempted from screening by the Australian Foreign
Investment Review Board with the threshold for screening in most
sectors raised to $600 million." 11 Under the AUSFTA, "90 per cent of
investments that were screened prior to the FT A will now be exempted
from screening," benefiting U.S. investors with an interest m
Australia. 12
Under the AUSFTA, U.S. investors will be attracted to
"Australia's growing services market, including telecommunications,
express delivery, computer and IT, tourism, energy, construction and
engineering, financial services, audio-visual and entertainment,
professional, education and training." 13
In a media release dated January 1, 2005, then U.S. Trade
Representative, Robert B. Zoellick, stated that the AUSFTA "is a
milestone in the history of our alliance," 14 as it was the first FTA
between the U.S. and a developed state since 1988. 15 Zoellick
continued, "[t]his is a 21st century, state-of-the-art agreement that
reflects the modem globalized economy. By opening trade ... [and]
eliminating barriers in ... investment ... the agreement will strengthen

8. New S. Wales Dep't of State and Reg'l Dev., Foreign Direct Investment Confidence
Index 2004, available at http://www.business.nsw.gov/au/facts (follow "Section B-Trade
and Investment" hyperlink, then follow "B6: Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index,
2004" hyperlink).
9. New S. Wales Dep't of State and Reg'l Dev., supra note 8 (follow "Section B-Trade
and Investment" hyperlink, then follow "B9: Stock of Foreign Investment in Australia by
Country, 2004" hyperlink).
10. American Australian Association, supra note 5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Press Release, U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva, Landmark U.S.-Australia Free
Trade Agreement Goes into Effect Today, (Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://usmission.ch/Press2005/0103landmarkusaustralia.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
15. Id.

Published by SURFACE, 2006

5

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5

158

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 34:153

U.S.-Australian economic ties." 16
The effect of the recently enacted AUSFTA is likely, therefore, to
increase investor interest in Australia by providing greater market
access for U.S. firms.
Much of Australia's FDI activities results from cross-border M&A.
According to the New South Wales Department of State and Regional
Development website: "[T]he growth in M&A activity reflects the
strength of Australia's corporate sector. Strong profits and healthy
balance sheets are encouraging Australian companies to actively seek
growth opportunities via M&A, both domestically and offshore.
Overseas companies are also buying into Australian companies." 17
In light of the above, given that corporate law is a significant
product having a presence in the market for corporate control "down
under," the design of this product should be of interest just as much to
Americans (as well as investors in other jurisdictions) as to Australians.
It will be explained that while Australia is a significant player in
the region in terms of M&A, as one of the main M&A markets in the
world, the market is not large enough to warrant the elaborate
regulatory system operating in Australia at present. It is simply not
efficient and does not work as far as product design is concerned.
But change can be achieved without law reform. Rather than law
reform, economic efficiency can be injected into Australia's takeover
law by turning to the U.S. for inspiration, starting with an economic
analysis of law, with the law framed as a product in a market whose
existence can be justified if an efficiency improvement can be achieved.
Perceiving the law as a product in a market allows us to draw upon
principles of marketing, rather than adopting a conventional approach of
law reform, to make the product more effective. Marketing is about
responding to consumer demand. There is no reason why the product of
takeovers law should be removed from this process. This will be
explored in later sections.
The overriding position in this article is that as much as is
appropriate (that is, in the absence of clear distortions impeding
adequate investor protection and business efficacy), the market for
corporate control should be allowed to operate unfettered. As a
participant, government should only intervene in the market when it can
contribute towards the effective functioning of the market; that is, if

16. U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva, supra note 14.
17. New S. Wales Dep't of State and Reg'l Dev., supra note 8.
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government is a "pusher" in the sense described by Michael Porter. 18
I outline a proposal for redesign of the product of Australian
takeovers law, involving a fresh look at § 611(7) of Australia's
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), to achieve just that.
Towards Thinking about Australian Corporate Law: Drawing
Inspiration from the United States
A lot has been written recently about convergence, and about the
possibility of an "end of history," 19 in corporate law. I believe that
"Americanizing" Australian corporate law would have significant
benefits, both in terms of corporate law practice and theory.
Convergence along American lines would not simply be about
eliminating a conflict between ideologies, but would also be about
injecting life, energy and innovation into the practice and scholarship of
corporate law. As this article will demonstrate in the specific context of
takeovers law, this is a positive move.
Turning to the U.S. to generate inspiration for Australian corporate
law would prove very beneficial. In particular, a lot can be gained
through applying an economic analysis of law and corporate law, which
was born out of the U.S.
As will be explained further in later sections, economic analysis
treats the corporation as a collection of contracts between stakeholders,
and corporate law as a set of default terms which companies can (or
ought to be able to) opt in or out of based on a cost-benefit analysis of
the utility of these terms. External regulation in the form of corporate
law rules is considered justifiable only if the rules can generate an
efficiency improvement over and above the market. In the specific area
of takeovers regulation, economic analysis sees corporate law rules
operating in a "market for corporate control."
Corporate law rules can therefore collectively be treated as a
product in a market, and will only (and should only) survive if they are
designed and marketed effectively to respond to consumer demand in
the market.
Structure of the Article
One key theme of the article, which will shape the analysis and my
approach, is that corporate law, and regulation through public sources

18. MICHAELE. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 681 (1998).
19. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001).
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more generally, is a product in the market for corporate control. To
have in place an effective place in the market, the product provider
needs to work out how to best deliver it so that it performs a desirable
function. In this sense, this article is very much about the effective
marketing of Australian takeovers law, and the application of
established principles of marketing to achieve better product
management, rather than being about conventional law reform.
We are dealing with a market for corporate control, a strong
market with a lot of potential, and therefore need to approach Australian
takeovers law through this fresh lens.
Accordingly, Part I explores in some detail basic principles of
marketing, and the specific arm of marketing known as product
management, and applies this learning to takeovers law in order to
explore how this product can be made more effective in a market for
corporate control.
Takeovers law is placed in an otherwise unfettered market for
corporate control and needs to be approached as such. We are simply
dealing with a product in a market, and working out how to design and
manage that product so that its place in the market is justified.
This article also takes the position that regulatory reform is only
warranted if it leads to an efficiency improvement. It is explained that
this does not come at the expense of investor protection. The vision for
takeovers regulation explored in this article does not in any way
undermine investor protection. The protections that have been in place
will remain in place. Moreover, it could be said that investors are in
fact greatly empowered by the vision outlined by way of enhanced
choice.
It is time for excitement, innovation, and just plain thinking, about
Australian corporate law, and takeovers law more specifically. As will
be elucidated, innovation leads to improved efficiency, and the injection
of efficiency leads to tangible improvements in the economy which
helps people's lives. In this case, a more sophisticated market for
corporate control, can produce a stronger economy.
As former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating said in 1996,
"[i]n the end it's the big picture which changes nations," and "[t]here
has to be imagination, and there's got to be belief." 20
This article is structured as follows. Part I provides some

20. Prime Minister Paul Keating (Austl.), Concession Speech (Mar. 2, 1996), available
at http://www.australianpolitics.com/elections/ 1996/96-03-02keating-concession. shtml (last
visited Nov. 28, 2006).
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background on the U.S. economy and the U.S. takeovers market, as a
prelude to exploring the economic analysis of law- a movement which
began in the U.S. There will be a particular focus on the economic
analysis of takeovers regulation, along with a discussion of takeovers
regulation in the U.S. The concept of the "market for corporate control"
will be considered.
Part II introduces the reader to Australian takeovers regulation.
Through two key regimes making up the regulation of takeovers, or
what will also be referred to as "corporate control transactions," the
"Chapter 6" takeovers code and the scheme of arrangement procedure in
Part 5 .1 of the Corporations Act, will also be explored. Section 611 (7)
of the Corporations Act, an important component of the regulation of
takeovers in Australia and which is central to the discussion in Part III,
will also be introduced.
In Part III, I paint a picture of how I would like takeovers law in
Australia to be approached. First, it is argued that, drawing on U.S.
economic analysis of law, corporations should have greater freedom
concerning whether they abide by formal takeover rules (takeovers law
provided in legislation), or provide their own alternative rules. It is
discussed that this potential for flexibility is already facilitated in
Australian takeovers regulation, but is not really treated as such.
If this flexibility is embraced, it is argued that there would not be
the need for a dual regime of Chapter 6 and schemes to regulate
takeovers in Australia. Accordingly, contrary to what Australian M&A
lawyers Tony Damian and Andrew Rich contend in their recent
monograph Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan Peaks, 21 I believe that
the schemes regime should no longer be used for takeovers. It is in this
sense that I argue it is time to return down the mountain. I argue that
takeovers law in Australia should come in the form of a self-contained
Chapter 6. It is explained that, with greater use of § 611 (7) of the
Corporations Act, this would not come at the expense of some
acknowledged commercial benefits of using schemes of arrangement
for corporate control transactions as an alternative to Chapter 6.
Part III also explains how § 611 (7) of the Corporations Act can be
utilized to provide for greater flexibility in the regulation of takeovers,
and make Australian takeovers law more efficient and effective as a
product in the market for corporate control. Part IV concludes.

21.
(2004).

TONY DAMIAN
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ALL THEWAY WITH THE U.S.A.
A.

Harold Holt was Right

This article draws inspiration from the U.S. to improve the design
of Australian takeovers law in the market for corporate control. It is in
this sense that I believe we should go "all the way with the U.S.A."
This is similar to the statement made by former Australian Prime
Minister, Harold Holt, in 1966 that Australia should go "[a]ll the way
with LBJ"22 - referring to U.S. President Lyndon Johnson. Holt made
the statement as support for the U.S.-led Vietnam War. 23
Below I provide some context for why I believe that Australia
should follow the U.S. line in regulating takeovers.
B.

The Brilliance of the U.S. Economy

According to the World Bank's World Data Profile for 2004, the
world GDP for 2004 was $41.4 trillion (USD) (40.3 trillion GNI).
During this period, U.S. GDP was $11.7 trillion (USD) (12.l trillion
GNI). Therefore, the U.S. accounts for roughly 25% of the world
economy. 24
The magnitude of the U.S. economy is emphasized by considering
the size of other developed economies. According to the same World
Bank data, for 2004, UK GDP was $2.1 trillion (USD), Japan was $4.6
trillion (USD), Germany was $2. 7 trillion (USD), China was $1.9
trillion (USD), Canada was $978 billion (USD), and Australia was $637
billion (USD). 25
C.

The Brilliance of the U.S. Takeovers Market

The U.S. takeovers market is second to none in terms of size and
sophistication. According to Mergermarket.com's "Deal Drivers USAHalf Year 2005,"26 in the first half of 2005, "buyers bought North
American targets with a combined value about 30% higher than the first

22. Australia's
Prime
Ministers,
Harold
Holt,
http://primeministers.naa.gov/au/meetpm.asp?pageName=inoffice&pmld=l 7 (last visited
Dec. 7, 2006).
23. See also TOM FRAME, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF HAROLD HOLT (2005).
24. The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators Data Query,
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2006).
25. Id.
26. Mergermarket.com, Deal Drivers USA - Half Year 2005, August l, 2005,
http://www.mergermarket.com/public/default.asp?pagename=remark_detail&docid=723
(last visited Nov. 23, 2006).
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half oflast year. At $531 [billion], it is on pace to hit $1 [trillion]."27
Mergermarket.com explains that "North American mergers have
not passed that milestone since 2000 when they totaled close to
$1.7[trillion] ... [T]here were three $20 [billion] plus deals in the first
half of 2005 . . . There were eight deals with values between $10
[billion] and $20 [billion]."28
According to recent worldwide M&A data from Thomson
Financial, for the third quarter of 2004 "worldwide M&A activity
checked in at $391.5 billion . . . bringing the cumulative 2004 dollar
value to $1.27 trillion." For the U.S., M&A in the first three quarters of
2004 totaled $568 billion. The third quarter total was $154.4 billion. 29
Importantly, what this means is that U.S. M&A account for roughly
40% of worldwide M&A.
In a recent article published in the Columbia Journal of European
Law, Mathias Siems commented that the U.S. M&A market is only
going to get bigger, due to a growth in cross-border mergers - in which
the U.S. will be one party to the merger. 30
D.

The Brilliance of U.S. Legal Scholarship

There is much that the U.S. can be proud of when it comes to legal
scholarship. It is clearly home to the best law schools and faculty in the
world.
One particular initiative that has stemmed from the work of U.S.
scholars, and has had a profound impact on the way we think about the
law (including corporate law and takeovers regulation) is the economic
analysis of law - otherwise known as "law and economics."
1. What Do We Mean by Economic?

Before delving into an exploration of the economic analysis of law,
it is important that one is clear regarding what "economic" means in this
context. According to the doyen of the modem law and economics
movement, Richard Posner, economics must "explore the implications
of assuming that man is a rational maximi[z]er of his ends in life, his

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. THOMSON FINANCIAL, THOMSON FINANCIAL WORLDWIDE M&A (2004), available at
http://www.thomson.com/pdf/financial/league_table/ma/3Q2004/244 l l /3Q04_MA_PR_US
_Global.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2006).
30. See generally Mathias M. Siems, The European Directive on Cross-Border
Mergers: An International Model?, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 167 (2004).
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satisfaction," defined as "self-interest."31 This concept of man implies
man's response to incentives; "that if a person's surroundings change in
such a way that he could increase his satisfactions by altering his
behavior, he will do so."32
David Barnes and Lynn Stout have also provided a useful
explanation of the meaning of "economic." 33 In their treatise on law
and economics, they define economics as concerning the resolution of
competing claims. Notwithstanding the various political perspectives
from which economists evaluate law, "many take the traditional or neoclassical perspective that evaluates the benefits and burdens of a legal
rule according to a single principle, economic efficiency."34
Economic studies rational choice in a world of scarcity. The
fundamental goal of economic analysis is getting the most from the
scarce resources available to satisfy society's needs and wants by
allocating them efficiently among competing uses. 35
2.

Efficiency in Economics

As we can see from the above commentary, a central concept
operating in the field of economics is that of "efficiency." According to
Posner in The Economic Analysis of Law, "efficiency" means the
"allocation of resources in which value is maximized. " 36 Economic
analysis perceives efficiency as being about "directing resources to their
most valuable use." 37
Hans-Bernard Schafer and Claus Ott in their work The Economic
Analysis of Civil Law provide another explanation of efficiency, as
employed by economists, which "has nothing to do with its common
usage." 38 A society has achieved efficiency where its members and its
resources "have achieved the highest possible level of utility." 39
31. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998).
32. Id. at 4.
33. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1992).
34. Id. at 1. As to the meaning of "efficiency" in this context, Barnes and Stout state
that: "Allocative efficiency means using scarce resources to the greatest possible advantage,
'getting the most' out of them. Whether a particular use is efficient will depend, by
definition, on what exactly one wants to gain or accomplish." Id. at 6.
35. Id. at 1-2.
36. POSNER, supra note 31, at 13.
37. BARNES & STOUT, supra note 33, at 17.
38. HANS-BERNARD SCHAFER & CLAUS OTT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CIVIL LAW
(2004).
39. Id. at 8.
The meaning of efficiency as used by economists has nothing to do with its common
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This explanation of efficiency refers to a particular type of
efficiency known to economists as "Pareto efficiency." This is different
from "Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency," which is well known in welfare
economics. 40

3.

Economic Analysis of Law in General

Scholarship in corporate law, as well as most other areas of the
law, has been made far more dynamic and interesting through the
application of thinking and concepts arising out of the economic
analysis of law in the U.S.
Even though a certain amount of the assumptions and conclusions
derived from an economic analysis of law are questionable, there is no
question that it has made people think, and has changed both the
scholarship, and even the practice of a variety of areas of law, for the
better.
Economic analysis of the law underpins the ideas contained in this
article.The "economic theory of law", according to Posner, uses
economics to "explain as many legal phenomena as possible."41 Legal
regulation employs cost-benefit analyses to allocate resources in an
efficient manner. 42 "Much of [the economic analysis of law] is
concerned with proposing economic explanations for legal phenomena
modeled in economic terms. " 43
According to Yale's Jules Coleman, Posner believes that where
usage. It has a very precise meaning that can then be used as an elementary
principle for the design of social institutions. A society is considered efficient, if
and only if, under the given endowment it is no longer possible to improve the
welfare of any individual and at the same time no individual has been made worse
off. In other words, given the resources initially available and their allocation, the
members of a society have achieved the highest possible level of utility. It should be
clear that a society with efficient institutions and legal systems is not necessarily
just. It may be the case that one has to accept a loss of efficiency in order to achieve
particular normative goals.
See also RAY STEINWALL ET. AL., BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION LAW 97-98
(2000) ("Economic efficiency ... refers to a situation where the economic system allocates
resources in such a way as to produce the goods and services which consumers value most
highly and are prepared to pay for, and it does so at the least possible price in terms of
resource use.").
40. For a discussion of these concepts, see Jules L. Coleman, Economics and the Law:
a Critical Review of the Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649,
650-52 (1984).
41. POSNER, supra note 31, at 28.
42. Id. at 27-28.
43. Id. at 18. See also Richard Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L.
REV. 757 (1975); Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1996).
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there are transaction costs giving rise to a role for the law, the law ought
to "mimic the market." That means that "the law ought to mimic ... the
Coasian market of rational, fully informed individuals completely
cooperating with one another in an effort to maximize joint welfare (or
profits) through mutually beneficial exchange. "44
Coleman also usefully explains that Posner's economic analysis of
law suggests that, "what is efficient depends on what people are willing
to pay and what people are willing to pay in turn depends on what they
are capable of paying."45

4.

Economic Analysis of Corporate Law

The economic analysis of law has been usefully applied to
numerous specialized areas of law. One of the more successful efforts
of utilizing economic analysis has been in the area of corporate law,
being the rules that regulate corporations (thus including takeovers
regulation). 46
In a recent article, UCLA law professor Stephen Bainbridge has
provided an excellent summary of how the corporation (and corporate
law rules) are understood applying an economic analysis of law.
Bainbridge, in the law and economics literature (with the so-called
"nexus of contracts" understanding of the corporation), suggests how to
obtain corporate law default rules: "'If the parties could costlessly
bargain over the question, which rule would they adopt?'-and then
adopt that bargain as the corporate law default rule."47
44. See Coleman, supra note 40, at 659.
45. Id. at 662.
46. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 57 (2002):
The governance of U.S. corporations is largely determined by the law of the state in
which each firm has chosen to incorporate. . . . Governance provisions in stock
exchange listing agreements can also be considered a form of contract given firms'
ability to choose the exchange or exchanges on which they are listed.
Id.
47. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV.
L.
REV.
1735,
1744
(2006),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=808584.
[L ]egal rules are analogized to a standard form contract voluntarily adopted perhaps with modifications - by the parties. As with any standard form contract, the
law's principal purpose in this area is to facilitate private ordering by reducing
bargaining costs. Parties for whom the default rule makes sense thus can take the
default rules off the rack, without having to bargain over them. Parties for whom
the default rules are inappropriate, however, remain free to bargain for a different
rule. . . . In such settings, identifying the party for whom getting its way has the
highest value becomes the crucial question. If termination costs are zero, the default
rules- whether contained in a statute or private standard form contract- do not matter
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In this sense, corporate law rules are a product that parties
(corporations) can choose to purchase "off the rack," or choose an
alternative product. 48
This "contractual" approach is beginning to have a major influence
on European corporate law and scholarship. This is the result of the
phasing out of the "real seat doctrine," and the shift to a "state of
incorporation" doctrine, through a series of decisions of the European
Court of Justice, starting with Centros. 49 The European Court of Justice
found that the real seat rule (which was applied in most EU member
states) was incompatible with the Freedom of Establishment guaranteed
by the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Community.
According to Dammann, with the adoption of a state of
incorporation doctrine, "it is the law of the state of incorporation, rather
than the law of the state in which the corporation's headquarters is
located, that governs the corporation's internal affairs. " 50 Dammann
goes on to explain that under the real state doctrine, corporations could
not choose the law of another EU Member State unless they were
willing to move headquarters. Thus, "because the costs of such a move
usually outweighed the advantages connected with a more efficient
corporate law, the real seat doctrine effectively prevented free choice."51
very much. In the face of positive transaction costs, however, the default rules begin
to matter very much. Indeed, if transaction costs are very high, bargaining around
the rule may become effectively impossible. In such settings, identifying the party
for whom getting its way has the highest value becomes the crucial question ....
We therefore perform a thought experiment: "If the parties could costlessly bargain
over the question, which rule would they adopt?", and then adopt that bargain as the
corporate law default rule.

Id.
48. For discussion of the law as a product, see Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON & ORG 225-53 (1985); Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.
J. 2359 (1997-98); see also Oren Bar-Gill, Michael Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Market
for Corporate Law (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 377, July 2002); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
49. See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European
Corporate Law, 2 J. CORP. LAW STUDIES_(2005); see also Robert Drury, A European Look
at the American Experience of the Delaware Syndrome, 5 J. CORP. LAW STUDIES_(2005);
John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory
Competition, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 5412005, 2005); Jens
Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51,
56 (2005). "Three decisions by the European Court of Justice - Centros, Uberseering and
Inspire Art ... is incompatible with the Freedom of Establishment guaranteed by the Treaty
Establishing the European Community (TEC)." Id.
50. Dammann, supra note 49, at 53.
51. Id. at 55. See also Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate
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5. Economic Analysis of Takeovers and the "Market for Corporate
Control"
Economic analysis of corporate law has become an incredibly
specialized branch of law and economics over the last few decades.
Over this time, there has been a major focus on applying the tools of
economics to a particular branch of corporate law- the rules regulating
takeover-style corporate control transactions.
This application of economic analysis was kicked off largely by a
paper published in 1965 by law professor Henry Manne. 52 In this paper,
Manne introduced the concept of a "market for corporate control" which
could discipline directors and managers, and work to align their
interests with the interests of shareholders. 53
Until this time, corporate control transactions were examined
solely in terms of antitrust (competition) implications, rather than their
impact on the internal governance arrangements of a corporation.
Ford's Principles of Corporations Law provides a useful account of the
thinking behind the market for corporate control, identifying reasons for
and against regulation where company management succeeds or fails in
achieving efficiency. 54
Law, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 477, 479-82 (2004); Carsten Frost, Transfer a/Company's SeatAn Unfolding Story in Europe, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 359, 364-69, 374 (2005)

("One crucial consequence of the . .. ECJ judgments is that founders within the EU are now
free to choose the company law they prefer."); Andrea J. Gildea, Uberseeing: A European
Company Passport, 30 BROOK. J. lNT'L L. 257 (2004).
52. See Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. Eco.
110 (1965); William J. Camey, The Legacy of the "Market for Corporate Control" and the
Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999) (describing the
origins of the market for corporate control, and Henry Manne's contribution to the law and
to economics); Kenneth Lehn, The Market for Corporate Control: Some Observations on
Henry Manne 's Contribution to Financial Economics, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 263 (1999).
53. Id. at 112, 113. He famously stated that, "[t]he lower the stock price, relative to
what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the take-over becomes
to those who believe that they can manage the company more efficiently." Id. See George
Bittlingmayer, The Market for Corporate Control, in ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON., 725, 730
(1999) ("Though control transactions have a long history in fact and in law, the academic
literature on the 'market for corporate control' and indeed the term itself begin with Henry
Manne ( 1965). His analysis focused on control transactions that would address the problem
of poor management ... Manne also argued that control of the corporation was a valuable
asset, and he advanced the idea of a 'positive correlation between corporate managerial
efficiency and the market price of shares."').
54. R p AUSTIN & I. M. RAMSAY, FORD'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW sec.
23.060 (12th ed. 2005).
Some commentators maintain that there is a market for corporate control which
provides an effective mechanism for correcting bad management. If a company is
badly managed, its shares will not reflect the company's true value. If the market
for corporate control is efficient, control will pass to an entrepreneur who is
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According to Ford's, due to this potential market for corporate
control, "[t]he imposition of any additional layer of regulation is
controversial. " 55
In a now classic paper on corporate control transactions,
Easterbrook and Fischel also explore how an unregulated market for
corporate control will reduce agency costs to shareholders and, thus,
increase the value of assets. 56
Another useful commentary on the function of the market for
corporate control was provided recently by Stephen Bainbridge in the
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. The market for corporate control,
according to Bainbridge, "is the ultimate monitor that makes the modem
business corporation feasible" to the extent that potential unsolicited
bidders have the incentive to investigate managerial inefficiencies
resulting in a depressed stock price. 57
prepared to replace the inefficient managers and thereby create an environment in
which shares will be fully valued. Regulation necessarily interferes with the
efficient operation of the market for corporate control, and on this view regulation is
consequently undesirable. . . . Others argue that in the absence of regulation,
shareholders of the target company are likely to be disadvantaged by a change of
control. Small shareholders are particularly at risk, because control of the target
may pass when the offeror purchases the holdings of a small number of large
shareholders at premium prices, and small shareholders may have no opportunity to
sell .... An intermediate position is to contend that takeover law should be optional
to the limited extent that shareholders should be entitled to decide whether their
company should be subject to particular mandatory rules.
Id.

55. Id. Troy Paredes also had commented on the regulatory implications of an active
market for corporate control that:
Corporate law is an important part of corporate governance, but so are markets. It has long
been argued that an active market for corporate control disciplines directors and officers to
run the business profitably .... [Further, a] robust takeover market should hold directors and
officers more accountable for their actions and, hopefully, curb any future outbreaks of
greed, disloyalty, and mismanagement on the scale of recent abuses.
Troy Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Towards a Theory of Takeover Law, 29
lOWAJ. CORP. L. 103, 177-78 (2003).
56. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982) ("[T]he threat of sales of corporate control induces managers to
perform well in order to keep their positions.").
Corporate control transactions can reduce agency costs if better managers obtain
control of the firm's assets or if they alter the incentive structure facing existing
managers. Corporate takeovers, and subsequent changes in management, increase
the wealth of investors .... [F]ree transferability of corporate control, like any other
type of voluntary exchange, moves assets to higher valued uses.
Id. at 705.
57. Stephen Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Direct Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31
DEL.
J.
CORP.
L.
(forthcoming
2006)
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=796224#PaperDownload
[B]ecause keeping the stock price up is the best defense managers have against
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It is also useful to consider the impact of the recognition of a
market for corporate control in terms of corporate governance in
general. In an article published in 2003, David Westbrook did exactly
that, explaining how, in the takeover market, the interests of profitseeking shareholders diverge from those of inefficient managers. 58
This thinking on the market for corporate control, and the
economic analysis of corporate law and takeovers regulation, will be
applied in subsequent sections to promote a more marketable and
effective regime for regulating takeovers in Australia. It will be
explained that there is the potential to approach Chapter 6 of the
Corporations Act, and § 611 (7) in particular, will give greater
recognition to the market for corporate control and instill more
flexibility in the market.

E.

The Brilliance of U.S. Takeovers Regulation

In relation to U.S. takeovers regulation, there is an emphasis on
building a culture of disclosure, complemented by corporate law rules,
rather than treating takeovers as a hotbed for regulation. U.S. takeovers
law is based on a similar governing objective as Australian corporate
law (in particular that there be an efficient, competitive and informed
market for corporate control), but with less in the way of black-letter
law - particularly at the federal level. This is despite the U.S. having an

being disciplined by an outside searcher, the market for corporate control - more
specifically, the unsolicited tender offer - is an important mechanism for preventing
shirking by top management. Indeed, some would argue, the market for corporate
control is the ultimate monitor that makes the modem business corporation
feasible .... If close examination by a prospective bidder reveals that the declining
market price is in fact attributable to shirking by the top management team,
however, a disciplinary takeover could produce real gains for division between the
targets shareholders and the successful acquirer. This prospect creates positive
incentives for potential bidders to investigate when the market signals a firm is in
distress.
Id.

58. David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Re-imagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 102 (2003).
If Berle and Means inaugurated an era of corporate doctrine focused on the
separation of ownership and management and management's ability to abuse
shareholder interests, then Henry Manne may be said to have inaugurated the next
orthodoxy. At least since Manne' s work in the 1960s, corporate governance has
been understood as a commodity, regulated, like other commodities, by market
mechanisms. In particular, Manne and his many epigones taught that managers
were not free to do as they pleased with shareholders' money but were constrained
by market forces. There was a market for corporate control - it is, a takeover market
- wayward managers could and would be ousted by profit-seeking shareholders.
Id.
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economy, and a M&A market, many times the size of Australia's.
According to Mannolini, the U.S. "predominantly employ rigorous
mandatory disclosure and procedural requirements as restraints upon the
agency problems inherent in the corporate contract."59
As to the successful operation of a system of disclosure in the U.S.,
Cassidy and Chapple have usefully commented on the distinctions
between the U.S. disclosure regime and that of Australia. They suggest
that the more strict U.S. laws facilitate self-regulation and expedited
disclosure, particularly when companies present bad news for
shareholders. 60
Before proceeding to detail the rules regulating corporate control
transactions, an overview is useful. In his excellent casebook on
companies and securities law, Paul Redmond summarizes the U.S.
disclosure-based regime. 61
In the U.S., federal law is essentially disclosure based while much
state law is primarily concerned with protection of non-shareholder
interests including management, employees and local community
interests in takeovers; that is not the case with Delaware where many
corporations are incorporated. In the U.S., there is a relatively greater
freedom for both bidder and target management, and auctions for
corporate control tend to be easier and more common. There is no
direct counterpart to the equality of opportunity principle. The contest
between bidder and target sometimes becomes a Hobbesian struggle,
showing nature red in tooth and claw. 62

59. Mannolini, supra note 7, at 358. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
60. Andrew Cassidy & Larelle Chapple, Australia's Corporate Disclosure Regime:
Lessons from the U.S. Model, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 81, 85 (2003).
The enforcement of disclosure rules is a significant difference between the
disclosure regimes in the United States and Australia. In Australia criminal and civil
actions (including civil penalties) for disclosure breaches are rare, which has
resulted in less pressure on companies to provide timely and accurate information.
In contrast, U.S. companies have a stronger incentive to disclose because they
operate in a disclosure regime of strict enforcement, at least due to SEC enforcement
mechanisms being supplanted by private enforcement of disclosure law . . . . The
literature examining the US securities market suggests that strong enforcement of
disclosure law encourages companies to increase the quality and timeliness of
information presented to the market. Companies will preempt the announcement of
bad news to avoid large stock price decline, and subsequent lawsuits on earnings
announcement.

Id.
61. See PAUL REDMOND, COMPANIES AND SECURITIES LAW: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 890 (4th ed., N.S.W.: Lawbook Co. 2001) (1998).
62. Id.
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As will be explained later, given the success of American
takeovers law, there is little doubt that an international convergence in
corporate law will lead to the Americanization of takeovers regulation.
Australia's corporate law already has the infrastructure to embrace this
convergence, without the need for radical and costly surgery in the form
of law reform, ensuring that it remains a market leader in our region. 63
Commentators such as Thomson and Mannolini contend that
through convergence towards an Anglo-American model of corporate
regulation, the dominant paradigm internationally will be economic
efficiency. 64 Economic efficiency comes from product design and
management so that customers entering the market are willing to
transact. The prerequisite for an effective contract, as you may recall, is
willingness to enter into legal relations. The concepts of product design
and management, and their applicability to takeovers law, will be
discussed in the next section.
There has recently been a move in Europe to converge towards
what can be considered an Anglo-American approach to takeovers
regulation. 65
Under the 13th Company Law Directive on Takeovers, which EU
member states must now move to implement, contractual freedom
through "opt in" and "opt out" arrangements will become an important
feature of European takeovers law. Member states will be able to opt
out of some of the more contentious aspects of the Takeovers Directive
in their own domestic takeovers law. According to European law firm
Eversheds, "[t]he compromise now incorporated in the Directive allows
Member States to opt out of either or both of the prohibition on
frustrating action and the 'break-through' provision, although any
Member State that does so must permit individual companies to opt in
again."66

63. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19 (talking about the competitive success
of British and American corporations). There is talk of convergence in other contexts as
well. Most famously, in his book, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992), Francis
Fukuyama wrote that the only challenge before the world now is to forge a rational global
order that accommodates humanity's restless desire for recognition with a return to chaos.
FRANCIS FUKUY AMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN ( 1992). "History" is defined
in the book to mean "clash of political ideologies." Id.
64. See Mannolini, supra note 7, at 359; Robert B. Thompson, Takeover Regulation
after the 'Convergence' of Corporate Law, 24 SYDNEYL REV. 323, 327 (2002).
65. See Andrea Guaccero, Recent Developments in European Takeover and Corporate
Law, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91, 92-93 (2004).
66. Eversheds,
The
European
Takeover
Directive
(Jan.
17,
2005),
http://www.eversheds.com/uk/Home/News_room/Publications. page (select "Corporate"
hyperlink; then follow article, title and publication date hyperlink).
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The opt out component of the Takeovers Directive was introduced
principally because of German objections to the proposed prohibition on
frustrating action.
Another strong sign that the European Takeovers Directive was
heavily influenced by the regulation of corporate law in the U.S., and
the U.S. economic analysis of law is paragraph 6 of the Preamble to the
European Takeovers Directive, which very neatly sums up the vision
underlying this article as to how takeovers regulation can be repackaged
and more effectively marketed: "In order to be effective, takeover
regulation should be flexible and capable of dealing with new
circumstances as they arise and should accordingly provide for the
possibility of exceptions and derogations. However, in applying any
rules or exceptions laid down or in granting any derogations,
supervisory authorities should respect certain general principles."67
F.

Explanation of US. Federal and State Takeovers Law

What follows is a discussion of the mechanics of federal and state
takeovers law. I have selected some of the best explanations of the law
from recent journal articles, and provided extracts of these below. The
focus in this article is on federal law, although adequate attention will
be given to state law, particularly the law in Delaware where the
majority of public corporations in the U.S. are incorporated.
1.

Federal Law- Tender Offers

What I consider to be the best explanation of how tender offers, a
device regulated by federal law, work was provided by Kwang-Rok
Kim in an article published in the Paci.fie Rim Law & Policy Journal. 68
According to Kim, changes in laws governing tender offers have
promoted competition in the tender market by facilitating information
flow and enlarging the duration of the process. 69
67. Council Directive 2004/25, pmbl., para. 6, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC) available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0025:EN:NOT
[hereinafter 13th Company Law Directive on Takeover Bids]. See also Aditi Bagchi, The
Political Economy ofMerger Regulation, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2005).
68. Kwang-Rok Kim, The Tender Offer in Korea: An Analytic Comparison between
Korea and the United States, 10 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 497(2001).
69. Id. at 499, 504-07, 508-11. According to Kim:
Tender offers represent the most significant tactical development in the United
States' corporate takeover arena, and have been the "hottest" subject in the legal
world of corporations and securities for three decades. Prior to the passage of the
Williams Act, bidders could make very short tender offers, lasting only several days.
The Williams Act was passed in 1968, and exists today to ensure that shareholders
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Kim goes on to discuss the mechanics of the federal tender offer:
During the 1960s, tender offers, appeared in the United States, and
now are widely regarded as "the most effective means ... for wresting
control from a resisting management," as increasing numbers of
investors have embarked on campaigns to acquire controlling stock
interests in publicly-held corporations. In 1968, Congress passed the
Williams Act as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act").
The Williams Act added the following provisions to the Exchange
Act. Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act is designed to provide
shareholders with knowledge of potential purchasers' identities and
intentions by requiring disclosure from all owners of greater than 5%
of any class of securities. Section 13(e) limits an issuer in purchases
of its own securities. The SEC occasionally uses Section 13(e) to
"regulate self-tender offers, issuer repurchases in the open market, and
going-private transactions." Section 14(d), the major provision
affecting tender offers, requires any person who plans to make a
of target companies have the information and time necessary to consider offers, that
shareholders are treated equitably, and that a competitive balance is maintained
between tender offerors and target companies.
Id. at 499. See also Hui Huang, China's Takeover Law: a Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 166-67 (2005).
A cash tender offeror could operate in virtual secrecy like a corporate raider in the
pre-Williams Act era because the law did not require that "[a cash tender offeror]
disclose his identity, the source of his funds, who his associate were, or what he
intended to do if he gained control of the corporation." The Williams Act was
designed to protect investors by requiring sufficient information to be provided to
enable them to make an informed decision with respect to a tender offer. It is the
purpose of the Williams Act that the target company management adopt appropriate
defensive tactics to increase the value to target shareholders.
The objective of shareholder protection, however, may conflict with the economic
objectives of efficiency in resource allocation to the extent that the rule would
render the hostile takeover more difficult and thus diminish the contestability of
takeovers. The substantial costs associated with information disclosure and tender
offer rules, which are designed to protect investors, may effectively deter many
takeovers that otherwise would have been launched. Furthermore, it is widely
recognized that the target's management has the incentive to abuse defensive tactics
with respect to hostile takeovers for the purpose of entrenchment. Some takeover
defenses, which were originally designed as a means to protect target shareholders
from raiders, have been found to be frequently misused by the target's management.
For example, the target's management would use defensive measures to thwart a
hostile takeover that would injure their interests, regardless of whether the takeover
would be beneficial to the shareholders, resulting in the diminished contestability of
takeovers. This problem has been at the heart of the discussion of takeover law and
received a wide range of practical and academic attention.

Id.
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tender offer to submit all materials used in connection with the tender
offer to the SEC and to submit a disclosure statement similar to the
one required by 13(d). Section 14(e) prohibits fraud and "material"
misrepresentation in connection with a tender offer. Specifically,
14(e) makes unlawful any untrue statement of material fact, any
omission tending to make statements misleading, and any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts in connection with any tender offer.
Section 14(e) also gives the SEC authority to define and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent such acts. 70

More detail is also provided by Kim about the federal rules,
including Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations,
regulating tender offers. 71 A useful overview of the considerations and

70. Kim, supra note 68, at 504-05. Kim continues:
Although tender offers have proven to be a highly effective method of taking over
corporations, neither the Exchange Act nor the primary SEC Rule applying to tender
offers defines the meaning of the term "tender offer." However, a conventional
tender offer in the United States, as defined by extensive case law, is a public offer
or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to purchase during
a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities of a publiclyheld corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or
securities.
The United States Supreme Court, in Blue Chip Stamps. V. Manor Drug Stores,
stated that the analysis of the term "tender offer" should begin with the language of
the Williams Act. However, the Williams Act lacks a definition provision. Under
Section 3(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC has the authority to define the term
"tender offer." Various SEC proposals have suggested that Section 14(d) of the
Exchange Act should apply in more specific circumstances. However, none of these
proposals have been successful. Thus, it is necessary to examine the SEC's attempt
to define the meaning of "tender offer," and therefore the applicability of Section
14(d) disclosure requirements, through case law.
Id. at 505-06, 508.
71. Id. 526-27.
In the United States, the Williams Act provides the basic framework for assessing
disclosure obligations in the tender offer context. Section 14(d)(l) requires the
tender offeror to prepare and file a Schedule 14D-1 before commencing a tender
offer for more than 5% of a target company's stock. The disclosure required in
Schedule 14D-1 begins with the disclosure required by Schedule 13D.
1) SEC schedule 13D
Under Section 13(d)( 1) of the Exchange Act, any person who directly or indirectly
acquires more than 5% of any class of the securities registered pursuant to Section
12 of the Exchange Act must file a Schedule 13D statement with the SEC.
Moreover, the investor must send a copy of the 13D statement to the issuer of the
securities in question and to each exchange where the securities were traded. The
information that must be disclosed on the 13D includes facts about the security and
the issuer, the identity and background of the purchaser, the source and the amount
of the funds or other consideration used in the acquisition, the purpose of the
transaction, the interest in the securities of the issuer, the contracts, arrangements,
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procedures that arise in practice in relation to federal tender offers has
been provided by Christopher A. Iacono. 72
understandings or relationships with respect to the securities of the issuer, and the
materials to be filed as the exhibits. Although Section 13(d) does not expressly
require disclosure of any intent to acquire control, disclosure of the "purpose of the
transaction" has been augmented by SEC regulations to require disclosure of further
information regarding the purchaser's future plans for the issuer.
A loophole in Section 13(d) known as the ten-day window currently allows some
abuse of the regulations by securities purchasers. During the ten-day period after a
person crosses the 5% threshold of Section 13(d), thereby incurring disclosure
obligations, the tender offeror may purchase securities up to an additional 20% of
the class of the equity securities. By using this method, he might be able to pay less
for that 25% stake than he would have to pay after his Schedule 13D disclosure.
Consequently, the SEC would like to eliminate the "ten-day window" by requiring
the tender offeror to file the day after buying his first 5% and prohibiting the tender
offeror from buying any more shares until the filing has been completed. However,
Congress has not acted on the SEC's request.
2) SEC schedule 14D-l
After nearly ten years of the federal tender offer regulation under the Williams Act,
the SEC adopted a permanent tender offer disclosure schedule. SEC schedule 14Dl mandates disclosure of substantially more information by the tender offeror than
Schedule 13D.
In addition to the information required by Schedule 13D, 14D-l requires disclosure
of other specific items relating to the persons retained, employed, or to be
compensated by the target company and the purchaser's financial statement and
relationship with the target company. Further, as of a 1977 SEC Release, most
tender offerors believe it is necessary to include their own financial statements in
their Schedule 14D-l. This 1977 Release, which concerns Regulation 14D, states
that all financial information must be included in a Schedule 14D-l when it is
"material." Although the Release did not resolve all the ambiguities concerning
materiality, it did point to several nonexclusive factors that the tender offeror should
evaluate when disclosing financial information. Although case law provides few
clear guidelines concerning disclosure requirements, courts have affirmed the
heightened disclosure of 14D-l, reasoning that the required financial information
may be material to a target shareholder in determining whether to tender because the
shareholder may decide that it is more attractive to remain a minority shareholder
under a new, and possibly more efficient, management.
Id. (citations omitted).
72. Christopher A. Iacono, Comment, Tender Offers and Short-Form Mergers by

Controlling Shareholders Under Delaware Law: The "800-Pound Gorilla" Continues
Unimpeded - In Re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 645,
648-51 (2003).
Although the Williams Act does not define the term "tender offer", a tender offer is
generally "an offer to shareholders of a corporation to purchase stock of that
corporation." Often, the objective of the offer is to acquire control of that
corporation. In return for the stock, the shareholder will usually receive as
consideration either cash, stock, debentures, or stock warrants. Regardless of the
consideration, typically a tender offer will be regarded as either friendly or
unfriendly. A friendly offer is one where management of the target corporation (the
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The State Law

While tender offers are regulated at the federal level under the
1934 Act and deal with issuer companies, there is also a body of
takeovers law at the state level in the U.S. Furthermore, the federal and
state laws are not necessarily removed from each other. There is a
relationship between the two that adds some depth, but also interest, to
the regulation of takeovers in the U.S. In looking at state regulation of
takeovers law, the jurisdiction that commentators traditionally turn to

corporation whose stock is being sought) supports the offer, negotiates the terms,
and recommends the offer to the shareholders. In contrast, an unfriendly offer,
usually referred to as a takeover or a hostile takeover, occurs when the acquiring
corporation has received or anticipates opposition by management of the target
corporation. Because of this resistance, the most effective way for a corporation to
accomplish its objective is to make an attractive offer to shareholders of the target
corporation. A takeover may prove quite difficult for the acquiring corporation
because it is forced to finance costly publicity campaigns to attract public tenders
and may have to prepare for possible litigation.
The acquiring corporation may decide to make a tender offer to a specific target for
a number of reasons. The corporation may have determined that the target is a good
fit in terms of management compatibility that the two companies complement each
other financially, or the target's potential has not been completely realized. Once
the acquiring corporation determines that the potential target is a good purchase
choice, it may directly approach the management of the target. Often prior to this,
the acquiring corporation will attempt to buy stock in the target to secure itself a
stronger bargaining position if its attempt at a friendly tender offer fails. If the
corporation can obtain a majority of the shares and become the controlling
shareholder prior to making a tender offer, the success of the offer is more likely.
If the acquiring corporation foregoes making a direct approach to the target's board
or that approach is rejected, it will then commence the tender offer. The tender offer
is an important tool for an acquiring corporation because it is made with a time
limitation and is directed toward the target's shareholders. There is no requirement
that the board of the target corporation approve the terms and conditions of a tender
offer. In contrast, a merger or sale of asset transactions must get the board of
directors' approval and recommendation.

Once a tender offer is made the target company must advise its shareholders of its
position regarding the offer "no later than ten business days from the date the offer
[was] 'first published, sent or given' to stockholders." Within that period, the
target's board will review the offer with its advisors and may then recommend that
the shareholders either reject or accept the offer, or advise them that they are unable
to take a position on the offer. Regardless of their response to the offer, the target
company must file their response in a Schedule 14D-9 form with the Securities and
Exchange Commission prior to communicating it to its shareholders. As soon as the
tender offer is made, however, the target's shareholders can choose to tender their
shares immediately or wait for management's response.
Id. (citations omitted).

Published by SURFACE, 2006

25

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5

178

Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 34:153

first is Delaware, as that is where the majority of public corporations are
incorporated, and accordingly where there is an incredibly active market
for corporate control.
In relation to Delaware law, Iacono provides a useful account of
the mechanics of takeovers transactions. 73 Iacono goes on, discussing

73. Id. at 651-53.
Before making the tender offer, the acquiring corporation decides what form the
offer will take: a cash offer, a stock exchange offer, or a combination of the two. In
a cash tender offer, the acquiring corporation offers the target's shareholders cash
for their shares in the company. In an exchange offer, however, the acquiring
corporation offers its own shares in exchange for those of the target. Depending on
the timing of the offer and the financial condition of the acquiring corporation, a
cash offer may be more attractive to the target's shareholders.
Along with deciding the form of the offer, the acquiring corporation will determine
the terms of the offer, including how many shares of the target's stock it wants
acquire. The corporation will set a minimum or maximum amount of shares to
acquire. If it is unsuccessful in obtaining that amount, the offer will be often
withdrawn. A number of factors are considered when the corporation is determining
the amount of shares to be sought, and sometimes it will set the number of shares at
an amount that if successful, will allow it to complete a type of non-negotiated
merger.
Under Delaware law, this type of merger between a parent and a subsidiary is
referred to as a short-form merger. When a controlling shareholder corporation
makes a successful tender offer for the necessary shares of its subsidiary, it will then
complete a short-form merger.
B. Mechanics of a Short-Form Merger
Section 253 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (Section 253) authorizes and
outlines the procedure for a short-form merger between a parent and its subsidiary.
To qualify under Section 253, a parent corporation must own at least ninety percent
of the outstanding shares of each class of stock of its subsidiary. The purpose of
Section 253 "is to provide a parent corporation a means to eliminate unilaterally the
minority stockholders' interest in the enterprise," and the procedures of a short-form
are simple. After acquiring the required number through the tender offer, the board
of directors of the parent corporation first adopts a resolution stating their intention
to perform the merger. Then, the parent corporation files with the Secretary of State
a "certificate of ownership and merger" which states that the parent owns at least
ninety percent of the outstanding shares of the subsidiary corporation. Once the
certificate is filed the merger is effective. Any shareholders who did not tender their
shares receive compensation for them when the merger is conducted. A short-form
merger has no requirement that the shareholders of either the parent or the
subsidiary approve the merger; therefore, the parent corporation encounters no
resistance in completing the merger.
C. Mechanics of a Section 251 Negotiated Merger
Rather than attempting to acquire the minority shares of the subsidiary by making a
tender offer followed by a short-form merger, the controlling corporation may
proceed through a negotiated merger with its subsidiary. Section 251 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (Section 251) grants the authority for a
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the different standards by which Delaware courts assess the
involvement of coercion in takeovers transactions. 74
Another interesting aspect of takeovers regulation at the state level,
particularly in Delaware, is the development of standards of review by
the courts when considering defensive tactics by management of target
companies. The question is whether the defensive tactic is employed
with the interests of the target company's shareholders in mind, or to
protect the positions of management responsible for devising the
defensive tactic. Huang has recently provided a useful summary of this
contentious area of the law, highlighting the precarious responsibilities
of the fiduciary. 75
negotiated merger. Similar to a tender offer followed by a short-form merger, the
result of the Section 251 merger is that the parent corporation absorbs the target; the
target dissolves and the parent survives. The process of the negotiated merger,
however, is extremely different from that of the tender offer/short-form merger.
First, the board of both the parent corporation and the subsidiary must initiate the
merger by adopting a plan of merger. The plan of merger outlines the terms and
conditions of the merger, including the consideration that the target's shareholders
will receive, such as shares of the parent corporation, or cash. After each
corporation's board adopts the plan of merger, it is then submitted to the
shareholders of both the parent and target. For the merger to be approved, a
majority of the shares entitled to vote on the merger for each corporation must vote
in its favor. Also unlike a tender offer, in a parent subsidiary merger, the controlling
shareholders stand on both sides of the transaction. They are the parent acquiring
corporation and the majority shareholder of the target. This presents an inherent
conflict of interest because the minority shareholder will be forfeiting its shares for
consideration, which is "determined as a result of a bargaining process in which the
controlling shareholder [is] in a position to influence both bargaining parties."
In both of the transactions discussed above, a tender offer followed by a short- form
merger or a Section 251 negotiated merger, the controlling shareholder, the parent
corporation, owes a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders when executing
either transaction ....
Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 656-57.
Delaware courts have applied a different and less exacting standard of review to
tender offers made by controlling shareholders. In Solomon, the Delaware Supreme
Court determined that absent coercion or materially false or misleading disclosures,
a controlling shareholder is under no obligation to offer a certain price for the
minority shares. The court recognized that tender offers are generally regarded as
voluntary transactions; however, the court noted two situations where tender offers
may be considered involuntary. The first is where the offer is coercive. The second
is where the disclosures made by the controlling shareholders were materially false
or misleading. If an offer is involuntary, then the court will apply the entire fairness
standard. If neither coercion nor material non- disclosure are present, the tender
offer will not be viewed under the exacting entire fairness standard.
Iacono, supra note 72, at 656-57. See also Jason A. Gonzalez, Sunglasses: The Secret to
Making Tender Offers Fashionable, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 335, 338-40 (2005).
75. Huang, supra note 69, at 177-79.
In the U.S. takeover defense regime, as represented by Delaware law, the directors
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of target corporations are empowered to institute a wide variety of defensive
measures in response to hostile takeovers. Obviously, target management enjoys
substantial discretionary power. In order to prevent target management from
abusing their power to take defensive measures (for the sole purpose of
entrenchment), U.S. takeover law imposes levels of judicial review depending on the
perceived possibility of management opportunism. When target management adopts
a defensive measure against a hostile bid, Delaware law applies the "modified
business judgment rule" under which the directors are required "to show that after a
'good faith and reasonable investigation,' they saw a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness." In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided a leading case
regarding takeover defenses: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. In this case, the
court made several important developments concerning the judicial review of target
management's use of anti-takeover defenses. The court held that the board of the
target corporation "has an obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders." Having established this general
principle, the court then proceeded to articulate the directors' duties in the context of
takeovers. According to this case, the defendants, namely the target company
directors, are now required to show ( 1) "that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of
another person's stock ownership," and (2) that "it [the defensive measure] must be
reasonable in relation to threat posed." It is worth noting here that the defendant,
not the plaintiff, bears the burden of proof. This makes judicial review act as a
deterrent to abusive use of takeover defenses.
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., further developed judicial
review concerning the duties of target management when using defensive measures.
Under Revlon, directors' duties will change once the board reasonably believes that
the sale of the company is inevitable or the board takes steps to put the company up
for sale. Upon this triggering situation, the directors must discharge their duties by
obtaining the highest price for shareholders, rather than maintaining the corporate
enterprise, and cannot adopt a defense for the purpose of giving absolute priority to
a non-shareholder constituency.
Thus, the defenses permitted by Unocal could be a breach of the directors' fiduciary
duty if the company is in the same situation as Revlon. Two subsequent cases,
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. and Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., offered some guide to distinguish defensive transactions
that put a company into a Revlon situation from transactions that do not. If a
transaction contemplates a change in control of the target company, for example, by
selling a control block of the target's stock to a single person or corporation, then the
Revlon duty would be imposed on the target's management, otherwise only the
Unocal duty would apply. In short, under Delaware law, the use of defensive
measures is a matter within the business discretion of the target's directors and
officer.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Bittlingmayer, supra note 53, at 732.
State law affects the voting rights of shareholders, the duties of corporate directors,
and the defensive tactics available to target management, for example. This
influence over the mechanics of control ultimately affects the value of control.
In contrast to state law, the influence of American federal law is less direct, though
perhaps no less important.
Bittlingmayer, supra note 53, at 732.
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In relation to the law regulating defensive tactics in Delaware,
another useful source is Stephen Bainbridge's recent article in the
Harvard Law Review, which asserts that "the Delaware courts allow the
target's board of directors a substantial gatekeeping role in unsolicited
tender offers, which again is attributable to the court's recognition of
the importance of preserving the board's authority." 76
II.

A.

THE WEIGHTY PRODUCT OF AUSTRALIAN TAKEOVERS LAW IN THE
MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

Towards Effective Marketing of the Product of Takeovers Law

As has already been explained, this article is not about achieving
change through the conventional process of law reform, but rather the
effective marketing of a product - Australian takeovers law.
Given that this article is about marketing a product, and more
specifically using principles of strategic marketing to manage the
product of Australian takeovers law in the market for corporate control,
we need to have at least a basic understanding of these concepts.

1.

Understanding of Marketing Generally

In the field of marketing, there is an immense amount of material
explaining this concept. According to Ulrich and Eppinger, marketing:
(i) relates to interactions between firm and customer; (ii) facilitates
identification of product opportunities, customer needs, and market
segment definitions; and (iii) arranges for communication between firm
and customer, sets price targets, and oversees product launch and
promotion. 77
In his text, Strategic Marketing Management, Lambin defines
marketing as "the process of delivering to the market." 78 Lambin
conceives of marketing aspects, three-dimensionally: (i) active (the
penetration of markets), (ii) analytic (the understanding of markets), and
(iii) ideological (a market-oriented culture). 79
This article is concerned with both the analytic and ideological

76. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 47, at 1748. See also Bainbridge, Unocal
at 20, supra note 57; Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael J. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the
Coherence of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (2003).
77. KARL T. ULRICH & STEVEN D. EPPINGER, PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 3
(3d ed., 2004).
78. JEAN-JACQUES LAMBIN, MARKET-DRIVEN MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIC AND
OPERATIONAL MARKETING 7 (2000).
79. Id. at 4.
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aspects of marketing. It is about first understanding the market for
corporate control, and then fostering the operation of the market through
a more flexible and efficient approach to takeovers regulation.
In this sense, the approach applied in this article involves being
strategic in the way in which takeovers regulation is designed and
presented to the market. It is about being strategic in relation to the
regulation of takeovers, so that takeovers regulation is a more efficient
and effective product in the market for corporate control.
There is a discrete area of marketing known as "strategic
marketing" which is devoted to dealing with products in this way.
According to Lambin, "[t]he objectives of strategic marketing typically
include: a systematic and continuous analysis of the needs and
requirements of key customer groups and the design and production of a
product. .. that will enable the company to service selected groups or
segments more effectively than its competitors. " 80
2.

Product Management

A product is "anything . . . that might satisfy a want or need. " 81
Product management is a discrete and specialized area of marketing that
"is a function within a company dealing with the planning or marketing
of a product or family of products at all stages of the product lifecycle."
82

John Legge explains in his book, Product Management: Shaping
the Competitive Edge, that "product managers ... play a key role in the
success of the enterprises and in the promotion of growth in the wider
economy. " 83
What this article is intending to do is set out a "product strategy"84
for takeovers regulation in Australia, which will inject greater flexibility
and efficiency into Australian takeovers regulation through product
engineering, rather than law reform.
We are concerned here with "product strategy" and development of
a subtle process of "product engineering." Product management is about

80. Id. at 6.
81. Wikipedia, Product (Business),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Product_%28business%29 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).
82. Wikipedia, Product Management,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Product_management (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).
83. JOHN LEGGE, PRODUCT MANAGEMENT: SHARPENING THE COMPETITIVE EDGE

1

(1999).
84. See DONALD R LEHMANN & RUSSELL
ed. 2005).
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improving the "quality" of the particular product on offer. 85 Improved
"quality" is also an objective in this article - improving the quality of
takeovers regulation without law reform.
Legge explains that improving the quality of the "product,"
whether this be takeovers regulation or something else, comes from
being innovative. According to Legge, "[i]nnovations that introduce
new qualities of products [promote growth]. As with absolutely new
products, the successful introduction of a new quality of an established
product will attract customers, this time away from the old, lower valuefor-money product. " 86
In discussing the concept of quality, Legge provides credence to
the Japanese technique of "quality function management." This derives
from the idea that "quality means producing customer satisfaction, and
the job of product development is to create (or 'deploy') product
functions in order to create quality." 87
In applying principles and concepts in marketing to rethink how
we should approach takeovers regulation, it is useful to think of
takeovers regulation in Australia as being a "product" operating in a
While the formal legal rules regulating
"contestable market." 88
corporate control transactions enjoy monopoly status in the market for
corporate control (aside from the "competition" between Chapter 6 bids
and schemes), it is important for the "product" to remain attractive
through being efficient and effective.
According to conventional economic theory, in some
circumstances (private) monopolies are forced to behave as if they were
subject to competition because of the risk of losing that monopoly to
new entrants, or because of the availability in the longer term of
substitutes in other markets. Approaching the regulation of takeovers as
a product in such a contestable market may be useful to encourage
innovation.
Harvard Business School's Michael Porter wrote in his acclaimed
book, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, that a government's role
in a market is to act as "pusher" and "challenger" so that firms gain a
85. See BEYOND BRANDING (Nicholas Ind, ed., 2003); ROBERT BLAICH & JANET
BLAICH, PRODUCT DESIGN AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: MANAGING THE CONNECTION FOR
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1993); DONALD R. LEHMANN & RUSSELLS. WINER, PRODUCT
MANAGEMENT (4th ed. 2001); ROBERT G. COOPER ET AL., PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT FOR
NEW PRODUCTS (2d ed. 2001 ).
86. LEGGE, supra note 83, at 5.
87. Id. at 48.
88. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN
PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLING,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (rev. ed. 1988).

c.
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competitive edge. 89
I believe that the government's role in the market for corporate
control is as a "pusher" of a flexible and efficient product of takeovers
regulation as if the takeover laws are a product in a contestable market
(competing with the market itself).
B.

Honey, I Didn't Shrink the Takeovers Code: The Chapter 6
Unfriendly Giant

In other product markets, it is recognized that there is little virtue
in producing a large and unwieldy product when a smaller design can
achieve the same, or a substantially similar, function. Indeed, a smaller
design usually makes the product more effective.
Yet, in Australia we have a relatively enormous takeovers code
(Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act) to regulate a relatively small market
for corporate control. Applying a cost-benefit analysis and judging the
regulation through the lens of economic efficiency, Australia's approach
to takeovers regulation is troubling.
Add to this the extra fact, discussed further below, that combined
with the takeovers code, Australia has additional schemes of
arrangement regime for regulating takeovers. Despite being placed in a
separate part of the corporations legislation to the takeovers code, you
would think that there is a fundamental justificatory reason why the
corporate regulator, ASIC, has facilitated a dual system of takeovers
regulation. But this assumption is wrong.
While there are certain commercial benefits which can be derived
from pursuing a scheme of arrangement compared to traveling down the
takeovers code road, we should not assume that schemes are
indispensable. They are not.
Further below, it is suggested that the separate scheme of
arrangement regime, as it operates in the market for corporate control,
should be abandoned. This does not require legislative change, but a
simple reversal of questionable ASIC policy that schemes can be used
for takeovers. Accordingly, it is suggested that Chapter 6 should stand
by itself as a single, self-contained product for regulating takeovers in
the market for corporate control.
This will not result in any disadvantage. All the commercial and
regulatory benefits that schemes were thought to have in their exclusive
domain will be maintained. There is no magic to a "scheme" that
cannot be achieved through an alternative "arrangement." Indeed, more
89. MICHAELE. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (2d. ed. 1998).
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than this, as will be explained, all the benefits will be preserved, while
some of the costs associated with schemes will be avoided.
While the courts will no longer have a central role in the regulation
of corporate control transactions, which they do at present for schemes
of arrangement, it is envisaged that a makeover of the takeovers code,
principally through improving the "quality" of § 611 (7) within Chapter
6, will protect shareholders through a supervisory role by ASIC (which
essentially already is in place in the schemes and takeovers process),
and the jurisdiction of the Takeovers Panel when issues of control arise
to hear and determine complaints of "unacceptable circumstances."

1.

Introduction to the Chapter 6 Code

As to the basic principles of Australian takeovers regulation,
contained in Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act, Ford's Principles of
Corporations Law describes the parameters of corporate control and
restructuring transactions. 9 Ford's also explains how Chapter 6 will
impose blanket prohibitions, under certain circumstances, subject to
specific gateway procedures and exemptions. 91
The last gateway mentioned is the focus of this article, and will be
explored in detail below when discussing § 611 (7) and how it can be
used to inject greater flexibility into the market. The rest of Chapter 6,
with its 50 odd sections taking up dozens of pages in the Corporations

°

90. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.040.
The takeovers which are regulated under Chapter6 of the Corporations Act are
corporate control or restructuring transactions involving an acquisition of voting
shares by a bidder in a target company which has more than 50 members. The
policy reflected in the Corporations Act is that an acquisition which allows the
bidder to influence more than 20% of the voting shares in the target should be
subject to regulatory supervision. Once the bidder has reached the 20% threshold,
further acquisitions should be supervised until 90% of the target has been acquired.
Id. For a useful overview of the law regulating takeovers in Australia, see Tony Damian &
Andrew Rich, Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan Peaks: The Use of Schemes of
Arrangement to Effect Change of Control Transactions 6-8 (2004); I. Renard & J.G.
Santamaria, Takeovers and Reconstructions in Australia, looseleaf service.
91. See AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.090.
Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act seeks to regulate takeovers by imposing a blanket
prohibition on acquisitions beyond the 20% threshold, unless certain gateways and
exemptions are used. The principal (but by no means the only) means of lawfully
exceeding the 20% threshold are:
•
by making offers under an off-market bid;
•
by making offers under a market bid;
•
by acquiring not more than 3% of the voting shares of the target in any
period of six months; and
•
by making the takeover after shareholder approval.
Id.
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Act, essentially builds on this position. 92
2.

Eggleston Principles

The most important prov1s10n in Chapter 6 is § 605, which
expresses the purposes of the Chapter, including the so-called
'Eggleston principles. ' 93 These purposes form the basis for the specific
provisions taking up the pages of Chapter 6, and also are consulted by
the Takeovers Panel in determining whether to make a declaration of
"unacceptable circumstances."94 The function of the Takeovers Panel in
Australia is explained below.
Ford's states that, "[m]uch of the statutory regulation is designed
to ensure that the takeover bid proceeds in accordance with the
Eggleston principles and in particular, that the target shareholders are
accorded equality of opportunity."95
The principles, known as the 'Eggleston principles,' emerged from
recommendations in a 1969 report of the Company Law Advisory
Committee, chaired by Richard Eggleston. 96

92. REDMOND, supra note 61, at 898. As Paul Redmond notes:
The central provision in Australian takeover regulation, that gives technical effect to
the regulatory goals, is contained in Section 606(1 ). However, the person may
acquire the relevant interest under one of the exceptions set out in Section 611
without contravening Section 606, Section 606(1)(A). The prohibition acts as a
takeover threshold, stopping anyone crossing its barrier of 20 percent of voting
power by share acquisition unless they do by means of one or more of the
sanctioned paths each of which pays its respects to the Eggleston principles.
Id.

Section 606(1) of the Act provides:
A person must not acquire a relevant interest in issued voting shares in a company
if:
(a) the company is:
(i) a listed company; or
(ii) an unlisted company with more than 50 members; and
(b) the person acquiring the interest does so through a transaction in relation to
securities entered into by or on behalf of the person; and
(c) because of the transaction, that person's or someone else's voting power in the
company increases:
(i) from 20% or below to more than 20%; or
(ii) from a starting point that is above 20% and below 90%
Corporations Act, 2001, § 606(1) (Austl.).
93. REDMOND, supra note 61.
94. See Benedict Sheehy, Australia's Eggleston Principles in Takeover Law: Social
and Economic Sense?, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 218 (2004).
95. See AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.350. For a useful discussion on the
"principles shaping Australian takeover regulation," see also REDMOND, supra note 61, at
887-89.
96. See The PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., Co. LAW ADVISORY
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Ford's also summarizes the purposes of Chapter 6, now expressed
in § 602 of the Act. The authors comment that the purpose of Chapter 6
is to ensure: (i) efficient, competitive, and informed market acquisitions;
(ii) proper extent of disclosure and time to utilize the information; (iii)
reasonable and equal participation, by voting shareholders, in the
benefits accruing to them; and (iv) execution of appropriate
procedures. 97
In the Australian Government's Co~orate Law Economic Reform
Program (CLERP) 4 policy document, 9 titled Corporate Control: A
Better Environment for Productive Investment, released in 1997, it is
stated that the "Eggleston principles provide the philosophical
underpinning" for the current takeover rules. 99 Redmond notes that the
extent to which these principles have influenced Australian takeovers

COMM. TO THE STANDING COMM. OF ATTY'S-GEN., 2D INTERIM REPORT, PARL. PAPER No. 43
(1969), available at http://www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp?ContentID=494 (last visited
Nov. 24, 2006). See also AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.060. Ford's comments
that:
The Eggleston Committee expressed the opinion that where there is a proposal
pursuant to which a bidder would acquire a substantial interest, it is necessary to
ensure that:
(I) the shareholders are carefully informed, and in particular that they have
knowledge of:
(a) the bidder's identity; and
(b) all matters which may be relevant to the merits of the proposal;
(2) the shareholders have sufficient time reasonably to assess the merits of the
proposal; and
(3) as far as practicable, all shareholders have an equal opportunity to share in any
benefits accruing to any shareholder under the proposal. [This is the most
controversial part.].
Id.
97. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.080. Chapter 6 ensures:
First ... that the acquisition of rights over voting shares takes place in an efficient,
competitive and informed market. . . . Second, a purpose of Chapter6 is to ensure
that the holders of shares and interests and also the directors of the company or the
responsible entity for the scheme, know the identity of the person who proposes to
acquire a substantial interest, have reasonable time to consider the proposal and are
given enough information to enable them to assess the proposal's strengths and
merits: s 602(b ).... Third, it is a purpose of Chapter6 to ensure, as far as practical,
that the holders of the relevant class of voting shares and interests all have a
reasonable and equal opportunity to participate in any benefits accruing through the
proposals: s 602(c) .... Finally, a purpose of Chapter6 is to ensure that "an
appropriate procedure" is followed as a preliminary to compulsory acquisition of
voting shares or interests of any other kind of securities under Part. 6A.1 s 602( d).
Id.
98. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., CORPORATE CONTROL: A BETTER ENV'T FOR
PRODUCTIVE INV. ( 1997), http://www. treasury. gov .au/documents/284/PDF /full. pdf (last
visited Nov. 24, 2006) [hereinafter CLERP 4 Policy].
99. Id. at 10.
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laws, Ioo Justin Mannolini has also written that the principles arising out
of the Eggleston report still provide the "conceptual grundnorm" for the
operation of Australia's takeovers law.IOI

3.

The Protective Function of the Takeovers Panel

An important feature of takeovers regulation in Australia is the role
of the Takeovers Panel. The Takeovers Panel, constituted in its present
form since 2000, endeavors to resolve disputes in a prompt and
commercially-focused way. I02 It may also issue a declaration of
"unacceptable circumstances" in relation to conduct involving a
corporate control transaction- regardless of whether there is a breach of
the takeovers legislation. I03
The principles contained in § 602 are at the heart of what the
Takeovers Panel does. The Panel does, and must by law, tum to the
principles in determining whether to issue a declaration of
"unacceptable circumstances." 104 Section 657 A(3) of the Corporations
Act states that:
[I]n exercising its powers under this section, the Panel:
(a) must have regard to:
(i) the purposes of this Chapter set out in section 602;
(ii) the other provisions of this Chapter .... Ios

The important part of § 657 A(l) states that: "[t]he Panel may
declare circumstances in relation to the affairs of a company to be
100. REDMOND, supra note 61, at 887-88
These principles have had a profoundly shaping effect upon Australian takeover law,
especially through their inclusion in the statement of the purposes of Chapter 6,
namely, to ensure that acquisition of control over listed companies or those with
more than 50 members, takes place in an efficient, competitive and informed market
and conditions corresponding to the four Eggleston principles are satisfied whenever
a person would acquire a substantial interest in the company: § 602.
Id. See also id. at 889 ("The first three principles are essentially concerned with the bid
process and protection again crude forms of coercion or deception. The fourth principle
asserts the claims of distributive justice, in the sense of fair or equal treatment of target
shareholders, against those of allocative efficiency.").
101. Mannolini, supra note 7, at 33 7.
102. See NICOLE E. CALLEJA, THE NEW TAKEOVERS PANEL: BETTER wAY? 2 (2002).
See also RODD LEVY, TAKEOVERS: LAW & STRATEGY ch. 17 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing
powers of ASIC, the Takeovers Panel and the Court). See id. at 240-48, for a discussion of
the Takeovers Panel.
103. See CALLEJA, supra note 102. See also LEVY, supra note 102.
104. See Corporations Act, 2001, No. 50, § 657A(3) (2001) (Austl.).
105. Id.
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unacceptable circumstances. Without limiting· this, the Panel may
declare circumstances to be unacceptable circumstances whether or not
the circumstances constitute a contravention of a provision of this
Act." 106 This is very relevant conduct that occurs under the § 611(7)
arrangement because of the emphasis in § 602 on investor protection.
Section 657 A, and in particular the fact that the Panel can make a
declaration of unacceptable circumstances even if the relevant conduct
does not constitute a contravention of the Act, will become important
when discussing the proposed reinvigoration of § 611 (7) below. The
website of the Takeovers Panel (www.takeovers.gov.au) is also a useful
source of information concerning the role of the Panel. 107
In relation to § 657 A, mentioned above, and the Takeovers Panel's
powers to issue a declaration of unacceptable circumstances, the Panel
has issued a series of so-called "guidance notes" indicating how it
intends to exercise its powers under the Act. Guidance Note 1,
available on the Panel's website, outlines the factors to be considered by
the Panel when determining whether to make a declaration of

106. Id.§ 657A(l).
107. Takeovers Panel Homepage, http://www.takeovers.gov.au/ (last visited Dec. 6,
2006). On the website, it is explained that:
The Takeovers Panel is the primary forum for resolving disputes about a takeover
bid until the bid period has ended. The Panel is a peer review body, with part time
members appointed from the active members of Australia's takeovers and business
communities.
The Panel is established under section 171 of the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission Act (the ASIC Act). It is given various powers under Part
6.10 of the Corporations Act.
The panel has the power to make orders to protect the rights of persons (especially
target company shareholders) during a takeover bid and to ensure that a takeover bid
proceeds (as far as possible) in a way that it would have procured if the unacceptable
circumstances had not occurred.
The policy principles that the Panel aims to advance are those set out in §602 of the
Act. They essentially include the four 'Eggleston Principles' and an additional
principal [sic] that the acquisition of control of listed companies or listed managed
investment scheme, take place in an efficient, competitive and informed market.
Takeovers Panel, About the Panel, http://www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp?
ContentID=6 (last visited Dec. 6, 2006).
According to the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Bill that established the reinvigorated Takeovers Panel, the
intention was for the Panel to "take the place of the courts as the principal forum for
resolving takeover disputes under the Corporations Law, with the exception of civil
claims after a takeover has occurred and criminal prosecutions." House of
Representative, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act Explanatory
Memorandum
(Takeovers),
1999,
at
~7.3
available
at
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view .htm?DocID=NEM%2FEM 199959%2FNAT%2
FAT0%2F00007 (last visited Dec. 6, 2006).
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unacceptable circumstances. 108
4.

Takeovers and Corporate Law Economic Reform

The reforms made to the Corporations Act in 2000, which involved
a redrafting of Chapter 6 and the introduction of a reinvigorated
Takeovers Panel, were explicitly designed to "simplify" the regulation
of takeovers, and make takeovers regulation more "efficient." As has
been pointed out numerous times to date, this is also the objective
behind the ideas expressed in this article.
The reform of the takeover provisions was regarded by the
government as a fundamental part of its economic policy. This is
because takeovers, and the potential for takeovers through an effective
system of regulation, has a disciplining effect on management and
therefore works to enhance efficiency.
In applying economic
considerations to the regulation of takeovers in Australia, the thinking in
"law and economics," discussed earlier, becomes very relevant. 109
The economic basis for the most recent renovation of the takeovers
law, was explained in detail in the Department of Treasury's CLERP 4
policy paper, which preceded the reforms. 110 According to the paper,
the CLERP "brings an economic focus to corporate law reform and
aims to ensure that the Corporations Law facilitates investment, while
maintaining confidence in the business environment and protecting
investors." 111

108. Takeover Panel, Guidance, Guidance Note I: unacceptable circumstances,
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/display.asp?ContentID=837 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006)
[hereinafter Guidance Note 1]. Further, it was stated that the Panel is to be a "specialist
body largely comprised of takeover experts," who will resolve takeover disputes as quickly
and effectively as possible, "on the basis of their commercial merits," and thereby minimize
tactical litigation. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 107. See generally Emma
Armson, An Empirical Study of the First Five Years of the Takeovers Panel, 27 SYDNEY. L.
REV. 665 (2005); Emma Armson, The Australian Takeovers Panel: Commercial Body or
Quasi-Court?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 565 (2004).
109. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.080. According to FORD'S PRINCIPLES:
... [t]he reform of the takeover provisions by the CLERP Act 1999 was regarded by
the government as a fundamental part of its economic policies .... Takeovers were
said to promote efficiency in the capital market because the threat of takeover
provides a strong incentive for corporate management to use capital efficiently, and
conversely, failure to use a company's capital efficiently is likely to be reflected in
an under-performing share price and hence vulnerability to takeover. Consequently,
it was said, if a takeover occurs, it should result in resources being allocated to a
more productive use.
Id.
110. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 98.
111. Id. at 5.
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Accepting the general economic approach underpinning the
CLERP, the policy paper then focused on the Government's vision for
takeovers regulation:
This paper sets out proposals for reform of takeover[ s] regulation
under the Corporations Law. The reforms aim to remove regulatory
impediments to an efficient market for corporate control subject to
ensuring a sound investor protection regime ....
The basic objective of takeover regulation is to improve market
efficiency.
Specifically, regulation is directed at achieving an
appropriate balance between encouraging efficient management and
ensuring a sound investor protection regime, particularly for minority
investors. . . . All regulation involves some cost and it is essential to
ensure that the benefits from regulation outweigh consequential costs. 112
C.

Time to Clean Out The Attic: The Antiquated Schemes of
Arrangement Regime

As was noted above, the second (and probably less well known)
part of the dual structure regulating corporate control transactions in
Australia is the scheme of arrangement. While the use of schemes to
effect corporate control transactions has grown over time, schemes are
still more limited in scope because they can only be used in "friendly"
mergers. Schemes cannot be used for so-called hostile takeovers.
Hostile takeovers are still the exclusive domain of Chapter 6.
According to Damian and Rich, in the four years from 1996 to
1999, schemes constituted 40% of "friendly" deals (deals valued at over
$200 million each). From 2000 to 2003, the proportion was 38%. 113
What follows is an explanation of the law regulating schemes, and
how schemes are used for corporate control transactions.
In the author's view, there is no mystery behind schemes of
arrangement; 114 they are simply just another form of regulated
agreement- this time, between a company and its shareholders, or
between a company and its creditors. The focus in this article is on a
shareholders' scheme of arrangement. 115
In Australia, schemes of arrangement are regulated predominantly

112. Id. at 5, 7.
113. See DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at 93.
114. James McConvill, Schemes of Arrangement, Selective Buy-Backs & Village
Roadshow 's Preference Share Tussle: Entering the Matrix, 2 MACQUARIE J. Bus. L. 203,
205 (2005), available at http://www.law.mq.edu.au/html/MqJBL/vol2/vol2_9.pdf.
115. For a useful discussion of the practical aspects of shareholder schemes, see
DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at ch. 5.

Published by SURFACE, 2006

39

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5

192

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 34: 153

through Part 5 .1 of the Corporations Act, along with Regulation 5.1 and
Schedule 8, Part 3 of the Corporations Regulations (which sets down
the procedural rules for the scheme). 116 "Arrangement" is defined very
widely for the purposes of the Corporations Act (section 9 talks of
"arrang~ment" to include "a reorganization of [the] share capital of the
body corporate by the consolidation of shares of different classes"). 117
This essentially means any reorganization of the company affecting the
rights or interests of shareholders, for which there are not special
provisions in the Corporations Act dictating how this should be done. 118
For instance, Part 2J of the Act, which deals with share buy-backs and
reductions of capital, and § 254 H which regulates the conversion of all
or any of a company's shares into larger or smaller amounts. 119
In recent times, schemes of arrangement to achieve a merger of
two companies have become more common. This is mainly due to the
fact the offering company only has to achieve 75% of votes in support
of the merger proposal to be legally entitled to acquire the shares of
dissentient shareholders. However, with a formal takeover bid initiated
under Chapter 6 of the Act, a bidder company has to achieve at least
90% support in order to "mop up" the remaining shares pursuant to the
compulsory acquisition provisions under Chapter 6A of the Act. 120
A merger scheme of arrangement is an agreement between the
target company, meaning the company proposed to be acquired, and its
shareholders. Usually, the offeror company is substantially involved in
the merger. The shareholders agree to be issued with shares in the
offeror company, often along with a certain cash amount or some other
monetary arrangement, as consideration for the cancellation of their
shares in the target company. 121 Because a merger scheme is structured
in this way, it is only available for "friendly" mergers because the target

116. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 5.1 (Austl.); Corporations Regulations, 2001, pt. 5.1,
sched. 8, pt. 3 (Austl.).
117. Corporations Act, 2001, § 9 (Aust!.); see also Re NRMA Ltd. (2000) 33 A.C.S.R.
595, 606 (N.S.W.) (referring to comments of Santow J as to the wide scope of
"arrangement").
118. See Australian Sec. Comm'n v. Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd. (1993) 177 C.L.R.
485 ; see also Kanaga Dharmanada & Justin Harris, End of the Schemer's Scheme:
Limitations on Use of Schemes of Arrangements, 14 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 509 ( 1996).
119. Corporations Act, supra note 116, pt. 2J, § 254 H.
120. For a recent discussion of the operation of Chapter 6A, see Joylon Rogers,
Compulsory Acquisition under Part 6A.2 and its implications for Minority Shareholders, 31
AUSTL. Bus. L. REV. 97 (2003); Glenn Hughes, Compulsory Acquisition of Minority
Shareholders' Interests, 18 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 197 (2000).
121. See also Alberto Colla, Schemes of Arrangement as an Alternative to Friendly
Takeover Schemes: Recent Developments, 16 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 365 (1998).
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board must agree to put the resolution to its shareholders.
Schemes of arrangement can also be used for "de-mergers" (also
referred to as "spin-offs") whereby the shareholders of a large company
agree for the company to be divided into two or more separate
companies. The purpose of de-mergers is to "unlock" hidden value in
the company and to establish companies with particular areas of
specialization. Examples of where schemes of arrangement were used
for this purpose include the WMC de-merger in 2002 and the AMP demerger in 2003.
Schemes of arrangement are typically used by companies when
there is a risk that not all shareholders will support the particular
reorganization that is proposed. For a scheme of arrangement to come
into force, it is only necessary for 75% of the votes cast at a scheme
meeting to support the proposal. 122
The procedural requirements which govern a shareholders' scheme
of arrangement are set down in § 411 of the Corporations Act. The key
procedural feature of a scheme of arrangement, as highlighted by § 411,
is that a scheme is heavily supervised by the Court. A company cannot
hold a meeting of its shareholders to consider a scheme of arrangement,
send out information to shareholders about the scheme of arrangement,
or implement a scheme of arrangement, without the approval of the
Court each time. Thus, the concept of "arrangement" is very flexible
such that schemes of arrangement can be used for a wide range of
purposes by companies because of the involvement of the court at each
step of the § 411 process and because the work that must go into
preparing the scheme so that the Court ultimately approves of it,
schemes of arrangement can be an extremely costly and timeconsuming mechanism to effect a change of corporate control. 123
Under § 411, the first step is for the company to prepare an
explanatory statement (setting out, at the minimum, the matters listed in
Schedule 8, Part 3 of the Corporations Regulations), to be included in a
'scheme booklet' which is designed to assist shareholders by setting out
all of the material information regarding the scheme and its effect on the
shareholders. Often, a scheme booklet will include an "independent
expert's report," which states whether or not (in the expert's opinion)
the scheme is in the best interests of the company's shareholders.
Regulations 8303-8306 of the Corporations Regulations require an
expert's report to be prepared if the outside party is (e.g. the company

122. COLLA, supra note 121.
123. Id.
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wanting to acquire the target) involved in a scheme has a 30% or more
shareholding in the company, or if the outside company and the scheme
company have common directors. 124 However, common practice is for
a company to include such a report even if it is not required by law. 125
Once prepared, this booklet is lodged with ASIC (at least 14 days
before the first court hearing), who will review it to assess whether it
complies with the requirements of the Act. Following this, a first court
hearing is held, whereby the company asks the Court for an order
permitting it to convene a shareholders' meeting to both consider and
vote on the scheme. So long as all the necessary procedural and
substantive steps have been complied with by the company, the Court
will usually allow the company to convene a scheme meeting. 126
The company must then send out a notice of meeting to
shareholders, accompanied by a copy of the scheme booklet. So that
shareholders are capable of consulting at the scheme meeting with other
shareholders who have a sufficiently similar interest in the company to
them, the company will arrange (where necessary) separate meetings for
different classes of shareholders (e.g. ordinary shareholders, preference
shareholders, option holders etc). This is because § 411 (1) of the Act
speaks of a meeting of members or "classes of members" being held.
The test for determining if shareholders are assembled into appropriate
classes is whether the impact of the scheme on the legal rights of each
particular group (as opposed to their commercial interests arising out of
the scheme) is sufficiently similar to make it possible for them to
consult together "with a view to their common interest." 127
The shareholders vote on the scheme at the court sanction meeting.
For the resolution adopting the scheme to succeed, it must be approved
by 50% or more of the number of shareholders present and voting, and
by at least 75% of the votes cast on the resolution. If separate classes of
shareholders have been arranged, then each class must approve the
resolution by the "50% in number, 75% in value" test. 128

124. Corporations Regulations, 2001, vol.IO, sched. 8, §§ 8303-8306 (Austl.),
available
at
http://www.comlaw.gov .au/ComLaw/Legislation/LegislativelnstrumentCompilation l .nsf/fra
melodgementattachments/83659C7 524 DCC7 53CA2571850004498B).
125. See Alberto Colla, Has the Greenmailer Finally Been Eradicated from Australian
Corporate Law?, 20 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 318, 332 (2003) [hereinafter Greenmailer
Eradication]; see also IAN RAMSAY, JON WEBSTER, LAURIE MCDONALD & GRANT MOODIE,
EXPERTS' REPORTS IN CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS 4 (2003).
126. Id.
127. See Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd (1892) 2 Q.B. 573, 583.
128. See Greenmailer Eradication, supra note 125, at 332-33.
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If the resolution is approved by the requisite numbers, the company
then goes back to the Court for final approval of the scheme pursuant to
§ 411(4)(b) of the Act. The Court will look at the extent of shareholder
approval, and will consider whether the terms of the scheme are "fair
and reasonable" based on the opinion of an "honest and intelligent"
business person. 129 It is very, very rare for the court to reject a scheme
where the "50% in number, 75% in value" test has clearly been satisfied
- as it is hesitant to substitute its decision for the commercial decision
made by the shareholders. 130
An important point to note is that ASIC has a large role to play in
relation to schemes. It invests a great deal of time and resources in
examining the terms of the scheme and the requisite explanatory
statement, and in making appropriate submissions to the Court. Once
shareholders approve the scheme according to the requisite threshold,
They cannot act
shareholders are bound by the arrangement.
inconsistently with the arrangement, and the company can mop up
remaining shares through a simultaneous reduction of capital
resolution. 131

1.

The Stupidity of§ 411 (17)

A crazy thing about the operation of schemes in the context of
control transactions is that the corporate regulator, ASIC, has sanctioned
the regulation of takeovers through two separate mechanisms, Part 5 .1
and Chapter 6, even though Chapter 6 is specially designed to regulate
takeovers. 132 What makes this even crazier is that this dual system is
allowed to go on, 133 but schemes are subject to, and cannot depart from,
the protections in § 602. 134 This is because of§ 411 ( 17) of the Act. 135
129. In re Chevron (Sydney) Ltd. (1963) V.R. 249.
130. Greenmailer Eradication, supra note 125.
131. See AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.010. Ford's Principles of
Corporations Law explains that:
[t]ypically a scheme of arrangement is a plan by which a company is recognized in
some way which affects members' rights or interests. The scheme typically has
elements that are compulsory for members, such as a requirement that all members
transfer their shares in exchange for shares in a new holding company: Re Victorian
Grain Services Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 198 ....
Id. See Colla, Schemes of Arrangement, supra note 121 (overview of schemes); DAMIAN &
RICH, supra note 90, at 8-20 (overview of the scheme procedure).
132. See DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90.
133. The Australian Department of Treasury concluding in relation to schemes that:
"The current approach to takeovers by scheme of arrangement should be retained. This
would continue to allow schemes to be used to transfer control of a 'target' company to a
'bidder' company." CLERP 4 Policy, supra note 98.
134. Corporations Act, 2001, § 602 (Austl.).
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Section 411 (17), which commenced on 1 July 1982, prevents the
court from approving a scheme unless:
(a) it is satisfied that the scheme has not been proposed for the purpose
of enabling any person to avoid the operation of Chapter 6 (which
regulates takeovers); or
(b) the Commission states in writing to the court that it has no
objection to the compromise or arrangement. The Court need not
approve the scheme merely because of the Commission's statement. 136

ASIC's position on the use of schemes in the context of takeovers
is clarified to some extent in its Policy Statement 60, which has been
applied since the early 1990s. 137
ASIC also states that, "many transactions which cannot be effected
under a Chapter 6 takeover without modification may be effected under
Chapter 5 or, simultaneously with a Chapter 5 resolution. 138 For
example, the following transactions cannot be achieved by making
takeover offers alone:
(a) amendments of articles of association;
(b) reductions of capital;
(c) acquisitions of, and variation of the terms of, options and
convertible securities." 139

When considering § 411(17), ASIC Policy Statement 142 is also
relevant. Policy Statement 142 discusses that in relation to the ASIC
statement under § 411 (17)(b) that ASIC has no objection to the scheme:

135. Corporations Act, 2001, § 411 (17) (Austl.).
136. Id.
137. See ASIC, Policy Statement 60, PS 60.3 (Apr. 8, 1999), available at
http://services.thomson.com.au/asic/ps/ps060.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
ASIC, Policy Statement 60]:
ASIC's policy on transactions that can be conducted either as schemes or takeovers
is that ASIC and the Law have no preference for these transactions being conducted
one way or another. It is not the purpose of the Law to require persons to follow the
procedures set out in Chapter6 (in preference to other regulated methods) in the case
of all transactions involving acquisitions (In Re The Bank of Adelaide ( 1979) 22
SASR 481; Re ACM Gold Ltd (1992) 7 ACSR 231; Re Stockbridge Ltd).
There are recent cases which reflect the position expressed by ASIC in PS 60. See Re
Equinox Resources Ltd, (2004) 49 ACSR 692, at 19 ("the takeovers provisions of Chapter6
will not be regarded as having dominance over, or as automatically taking precedence over,
the scheme provisions of Chapter5."). See also Re Crown Diamonds NL, (2005) W.A.S.C.
93 (Austl.).
138. ASIC, Policy Statement 60, supra note 137, at PS 60.4.
139. Id.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/5

44

McConvill: Getting A Good Buy With A Little Help From A Friend: Turning To T

2006]

Applicability of U.S. Takeovers Laws in Australia

197

ASIC is concerned to ensure that takeovers that operate by way of
schemes of arrangement operate, and are regulated, in a manner which
is harmonious with the provisions of Chapter 6. This requires that
members receive all material information that they need for their
decision, members receive reasonable and equal opportunity to share
in the benefits provided under the scheme, and the meetings are
properly conducted. ASIC will not provide a statement under §
411 (7)(b) unless the scheme and its explanatory statement meet these
conditions. 140

In their recent monograph Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan
Peaks, Damian and Rich recommend that § 411 ( 17) be repealed so that
schemes have a completely separate operation to Chapter 6 in the
context of corporate control transactions. 141 It is my view, however,
that schemes should no longer operate in the terrain covered by Chapter
6.
If§ 411 ( 17) is to be repealed, which this article is not suggesting, it
should only be because schemes are no longer relevant to corporate
control transactions. As will be explained in section four, while using
schemes has certain benefits, these can be obtained through a selfcontained Chapter 6, which is reinvigorated through fresh thinking.
Section 611 (7) of the Corporations Act is the key to making this
happen.

2.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Schemes 142

It is noted below that I believe takeovers regulation in Australia
can do without the involvement of schemes. Rather than have a dual
regulatory scheme for corporate control transactions of schemes and
formal Chapter 6 bids, I believe Chapter 6 should stand alone as a selfcontained mechanism.
But if the use of schemes is so problematic in the context of
corporate control transactions, why are they commonly used? There
have been some attempts recently, in particular in the Damian and Rich
monograph, to clearly identify the benefits of schemes. Some of the
costs of using schemes have also been identified. These are pointed out
below.

140. ASIC, Policy Statement 142, PS 142.19 (Apr. 8, 1999), available at
http://services.thompson.com.au/asic/ps/ps142.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
141. See DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at Chapter 7. Damian and Rich also propose
that the takeover disclosure requirements in Chapter 6 of the Act be incorporated into the
scheme provisions in Part 5.1.
142. Id. at 50-71 ("Comparing Schemes and Takeovers" and "When Schemes are
Used") for detailed discussion.
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Advantages of Schemes

Some of the main advantages of schemes in corporate control
transactions are:
• Certainty- either the acquirer will get everything they
want at the date of the final court hearing, or nothing at all.
Situations do exist where achieving 100% ownership is a
critical requirement for the bidder. This would occur in
circumstances
where
tax
savings
and/or
cost
rationalizations are dependent upon 100% ownership (as
opposed to merely majority ownership) of the entity. This
is to be contrasted to a takeover bid under Chapter 6 where
a bidder could fall far short of the threshold needed for
compulsory acquisition (presently 90%). 143
• Transparency- in the way schemes are structured and
conducted. This is ensured through court involvement at
each step of the scheme process. This can, however, also
be seen as a disadvantage from the acquirer's perspective,
due primarily to the class voting arrangement and the
ability of the court to discount or disregard votes based on
extrinsic interests in schemes. 144
• Structural Flexibility- schemes can be used to achieve
lots of different objectives (e.g., demerger of business units
at the same time, buyback and return of franking credits).

b.

Disadvantages/Costs Associated with Schemes

In the last major policy consideration of takeovers in Australia, the
government's CLERP 4 policy paper included a summary of the
advantages and disadvantages of schemes in corporate control
transactions. According to this paper, "it has been argued that schemes
are cumbersome, slow and costly, and may have less flexibility than
takeover bids. For example, variations of a scheme require further court
approval or even recommencement of the entire approval process. Thus
it is extremely difficult for a bidder to increase the price offered under a
scheme and this may have "devastating" consequences if a rival bidder

143. In relation to a takeover bid pursuant to Chapter 6, § 661A(l) provides that the
bidder may compulsorily acquire any securities in the bid class if inter alia they hold, during
or at the end of the bid period, a relevant interest in at least 90% (by number) of the
securities in the bid class. The provision further provides that the bidder must have acquired
at least 75% (by number) of the securities that the bidder offered to acquire under the bid.
Corporations Act 2001 § 661A(l) (Austl.).
144. See DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at 3.
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offers a higher price." 145
Further, in terms of the limited use of schemes in corporate control
transactions, the paper notes that, "schemes will only be viable
alternatives to takeovers in a limited number of situations. For example,
schemes would not be a viable alternative to a hostile or defended
takeover bid, as it is the company which must bring the scheme before a
court for approval. This will form a 'natural' hurdle to using schemes
as an alternative to takeovers." 146
For a detailed account of the strengths and weaknesses of schemes
in the context of corporate control transactions, readers are referred to
Chapter five of the Damian and Rich monograph discussed above. 147
D.

Cleaning Up Takeovers Regulation: Removing the Dual System of
Schemes and Chapter 6 Takeovers

I believe that it is well and truly time to cleanse Australian
takeovers regulation of the use of schemes. Notwithstanding § 411 ( 17)
of the Corporations Act, schemes have traditionally been used to bypass
Chapter 6, and to achieve certain commercial benefits not considered to
be available when proceeding under Chapter 6.
But the scheme regime in Part 5 .1 of the Corporations Act was
never intended to give effect to a takeover. ASIC originally adopted a
policy enabling schemes to be used for this purpose to facilitate
takeovers of options and managed investment schemes that were outside
the scope of Chapter 6. But the law has moved on, and Chapter 6 now
specifically captures managed investment schemes (options are still
outside Chapter 6, but can be converted to cover securities for the
purposes of a friendly corporate control transaction).
While ASIC's policy, expressed now in Policy Statement 60, was
questionable to begin with, the retention of this policy now that Chapter
6 has been amended is totally inappropriate. Sure, there are some
commercial benefits of using a scheme rather than a formal Chapter 6
bid in particular circumstances, but this does not give ASIC a license to
radically alter the design of takeovers law in Australia.
If it is still considered desirable to have available an "arrangement"
for giving effect to a change of corporate control as an alternative to a
formal takeover bid, I believe this can be facilitated through Chapter 6
itself, rather than a regime outside of Chapter 6 that regulates a device-

145. CLERP 4 Policy Paper, supra note 98, at 53.
146. Id.
147. DAMIAN & RICH, supra note 90, at 82-93 (criticizing schemes).

Published by SURFACE, 2006

47

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 5

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

200

[Vol. 34:153

the scheme of arrangement - which was not designed to deal with
corporate control transactions.
Chapter 6 can be used in this way without law reform. That is, it
can be used in this way - now. The principal way in which this can be
achieved is through an elevated use of § 611 (7), a provision which is
quite unremarkable in appearance but can have remarkable implications.

E.

Section 611 (7) as the Mild-Mannered Hero

As noted earlier, § 611 (7) is one of the "gateways" in Chapter 6 of
the Corporations Act to enable a change of corporate control.
Section 611(7) 148 provides that an acquisition of a relevant interest
in voting shares that was previously approved by resolution of the target
company during a general meeting will be exempt from the general
prohibition on corporate control in§ 606 so long as:
(a) no votes are cast in favour of the resolution by:
149
. th e person proposmg
. to ma ke the acqms1tlon
. . . and th eir
. associates;
.
or
ii. the persons (if any) from whom the acquisition is to be made and their
associates; (hereinafter referred to as "associated persons") and

L

(b) the members of the company were given all information known to
the person proposing to make the acquisition or their associates, or
known to the company, that was material to the decision on how to
vote on the resolution, including:
i. the identity of the person proposing to make the acquisition and their
associates; and
ii. the maximum extent of the increase in that person's voting power in the
company that would result from the acquisition; and
iii. the voting power that person would have as a result of the acquisition; and
iv. the maximum extent of the increase in the voting power of each of that
person's associates that would result from the acquisition; and
v. the votin~ .P.ow9r giat each of that person's associates would have as a result
5
of the acqms1tlon.

The significance of § 611 (7) operating to enable shareholders to
148. AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 23.290.
Item 7 of § 611 exempts an acquisition approved previously by resolution passed at
a general meeting of the company in which the acquisition is made, provided that no
votes are cast in favour of the resolution by the acquirer . . . or their respective
associates. This enables the general body of shareholders to "opt out" of the
statute's protection.
Id.; AUSTRALIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORMS AND PRECEDENTS, CORPORATIONS: TAKEOVERS
1050 (Lewis A. Harris ed., Sydney, Butterworths 2d ed.) (1963) ("in order to satisfy the
prerequisites of § 611(7), the shareholders of Target must be in a position to make an
informed decision on the acquisition and therefore need a full and frank disclosure of all the
relevant facts.").
149. Corporations Act, 2001 § 12 (Austl.) (defining the term "associate").
150. Corporations Act, 2001, § 611(7) (Austl.).
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"opt out" of the formalities in Chapter 6 will be explored below.
ASIC's Policy Statement 74 (titled "Acquisitions Agreed to by
Shareholders") was issued in 1993, in an attempt by ASIC to provide
practical guidance about issues pertaining to § 611(7). 151 Policy
Statements 74.5 and 74.6 deal with the proper and full disclosure the
target company must provide shareholders.
[74.5] Section 623 [now § 611(7)] assumes that the directors of a
company will provide shareholders with proper and full disclosure to
enable them to assess the merits of the proposals and decide whether to
1 2
agree by resolution to an acquisition of shares.
[74.6] Directors need to ensure all relevant facts related to the
proposal are disclosed but should ensure all matters are disclosed that
are material and necessary for the shareholders to make an informed
153
decision on the resolution put to the meeting.

Policy Statement 74.8 also lists the information which case law
indicates shareholders are entitled.
[PS 74.8] Current case law indicates that shareholders of a company
are entitled, as a minimum, to the following information in the notice
of a § 623 resolution or the accompanying explanatory memorandum:
(a) the identity of the allottee or purchaser and any person who will
have a relevant interest in the shares to be allotted or purchased;
(b) full particulars (including the number and the percentage) of the
shares in the company to which the allotee or purchaser is or will be
entitled immediately before and after the proposed acquisition;
(c) the identity, associations (with the allottee, purchaser or vendor,
and with any of their associates) and qualifications of any person who
it is intended will become a director if shareholders agree to the
allotment or purchase;
( d) a statement of the allotee' s or purchaser's intentions regarding the
future of the company if shareholders agree to the allotment or
purchase, and in particular:
(i) any intention to change the business of the company;
(ii) any intention to inject further capital into the company, and if so how;
(iii) the future employment of the present employees of the company;

151. AUSTL. SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT 74,
ACQUISITIONS AGREED TO BY SHAREHOLDERS, (Aug. 12, 1993), available at
http://services.thomson.com.au/asic/ps/ps074.pdf (last [hereinafter ASIC, Policy Statement
74].
152. Id. at 74.5.
153. Id. at 74.6.
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(iv) any proposal whereby any property will be transferred between the company
and the allottee, vendor or purchaser or any person associated with any of them;
and
(v) any intention to otherwise redeploy the fixed assets of the company;

(e) particulars of the terms of the proposed allotment or purchase and
any other contract or proposed contract between the allotee or
purchaser and the company or vendor or any of their associates which
is conditional upon, or directly or indirectly dependent on,
shareholders' agreement to the allotment or purchase;
( t) when the allotment is to be made or the purchase is to be
completed;

(g) an explanation of the reasons for any proposed allotment;
(h) the interests of the directors in the resolution; and
(i) in the case of a listed company, any additional information that the
Listing Rules require to be disclosed.

See NCSC v Consolidated Gold Mining Areas NL (1985) 3 ACLC
520; Devereaux Holdings Pty Ltd v Pelsart Resources NL (1985) 9
ACLR 880; Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1989) 7
ACLC 81; Southern Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment & Trading Co
Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 913; and§ 73l(a) and (c) of the Law. 154
Policy Statement 74.9 goes on to state that it is ASIC's position
that shareholders of the target company should be provided with the
following information (by the target company or by the acquiring
company):
[PS 74.9] Shareholders of a company should also be provided with:
(a) the identity of the directors who approved or voted against the
proposal to put the resolution to shareholders and the relevant
information memorandum;
(b) the recommendation or otherwise of each director as to whether
non-associated shareholders should agree to the acquisition, and the
reasons for that recommendation or otherwise;
(c) any intention of the acquirer to change significantly the financial or
dividend policies of the company; and
(d) an analysis of whether the proposal is fair and reasonable when
considered in the context of the interests of, the shareholders other
than those involved in the proposed allotment or purchase or

154. Id. at 74.8.
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associated with such persons ("non-associated shareholders") (see ,-i,-r
11-31). 155

Policy Statement 74 also comprehensively deals with the issues
arising from the acquiring company negotiating an agreement prior to
the resolution being put to the target company's shareholders in
accordance with § 611(7). ASIC is prepared to modify § 611(7) where
necessary in order to remove doubt that the terms of the proposed
contract or agreement may be discussed and agreed upon subject to
certain conditions. 156 This is because the wording of§ 608(8) of the
Corporations Act leaves it open to doubt that such an in-principle
agreement would give rise to an "accelerated relevant interest." 157
ASIC' s main Policy Statement on takeovers, Policy Statement 171,
also provides some information on how ASIC intends to administer §
611(7). The relevant parts are PS [171.54] and [171.56], extracted
below:
PS [ 171.54]: We may give case-by-case relief for an acquisition
approved by a resolution passed at a general meeting of the company
under item 7 of § 611. This relief would be from the requirement to
give all information known to an associate of the person proposing to
acquire in item 7(b). The acquirer must show that they have requested
information from their associate, but cannot reasonably obtain it. 158
PS [171.56]: An acquisition approved previously by a resolution
passed at a general meeting of the company in which the acquisition is
made is exempt from the prohibition in § 606: item 7 of§ 611. For
the exemption to apply, the members of the company must be given
all information known to the acquirer or their associates that was
material to the decision on how to vote on the resolution: item 7(b ). 159

Ford's, in a statement quoted earlier, notes that § 611(7) can be
155. Id. at74.9.
156. Id. at 74.47.
157. ASIC, Policy Statement 74, supra note 137, at 74.44. The Policy Statement
further provides that such doubt would exist, even if "the sale would only be executed, or
the power to vote would only be given, once the proposed agreement has been agreed to by
non-associated shareholders." Id. In Policy Statement 74, ASIC also states that it wishes to
administer the law so as to give effect to what it sees as the implied limitation of§ 608(8), to
promote the practical operation of § 611 (7) in order to give effect to "its purpose of
promoting business efficiency and certainty, and [to protect] the interests of minority
shareholders." Id. at 74.46.
158. AUSTL. SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT 171,
ACQUISITIONS AGREED TO BY SHAREHOLDERS, (June 6, 2004), at 171.54 available at
http://services.thomson.com.au/asic/ps/ps074.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2006) [hereinafter
ASIC, Policy Statement 171].
159. Id. at 171.56.
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used so that the target company shareholders can "opt out" of the
formalities of a Chapter 6 bid. This provides for the kind of flexibility
and efficiency in takeovers regulation that "law and economics"
commentators advocate.
Rigid, complex, burdensome regulation
operates to distort the market for corporate control, which works to
effectively price control so that it is allocated to whom ever values that
control most.
But what we can see as a major limitation with § 611 ( 17) is that
only non-associated shareholders, those whose shares aren't being
acquired or who are not the acquirers, can vote. Section 611 (7) would
have much greater impact if associated shareholders could also vote.
Section 611 (7) would also be more significant if it could be used for
hostile takeovers- enabling the acquiring company to put the resolution
to target company shareholders.
As will be explained in the next section, there are mechanisms in
place in the Corporations Act to enable this to happen. There are also
examples where § 611 (7) has been used in this way (at this stage, to
enable associated shareholders to vote).
It is argued in the next section that § 611 (7) should be utilized
more regularly to promote a flexible and efficient system of takeovers
regulation. The discussion of the economic analysis of law, and utility
of limited regulation in the market for corporate control, highlights the
importance of promoting this approach to takeovers regulation.
Further, a§ 611(7) arrangement can provide for all the commercial
benefits of a scheme of arrangement but without the costs associated
with schemes. It is therefore time for § 611 (7) to be marketed
effectively.
III. MARKETING THE PRODUCT OF TAKEOVERS LAW
There are risks and costs to a program of action. But they are far less
than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inaction.
Our problems are man-made, therefore they may be solved by man.
And man can be as bi~ as he wants. No problem of human destiny is
beyond human beings. 60
- John F. Kennedy

160. The Quotations Page, Quotations by Author - John F. Kennedy,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/John_F._Kennedy/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
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The Genius of AS/C's Exemption and Modification Power

It was explained in the last section that takeovers regulation in
Australia could be made more flexible and efficient through directing
our attention to § 611 (7) of the Act. Section 611 (7) has enormous
potential. It can provide for a self-contained code, in the form of
Chapter 6, for the regulation of takeovers, rather than the present dual
regulatory structure of formal Chapter 6 bids and schemes of
arrangement, located outside of Chapter 6.
This elevation of § 611 (7) can be achieved without law reform. It
was explained that the mechanism to achieve this flexibility and
efficiency already exists in the Corporations Act. Instead, what is
required is fresh thinking about, and effective marketing of, takeovers
regulation in Australia. The market for corporate control needs to be
given greater recognition, and the assumption that formal rules are the
optimal method of improving regulation needs to put into the dustbin.
But what is this "mechanism" that can generate greater flexibility
and efficiency? Section 611 (7) is expressly limited in its operation so
that only non-associated shareholders can vote on a resolution. So how
can § 611 (7) step up to the task?
Further, even if § 611 (7) is capable of stepping up to improve the
efficiency of takeovers regulation, is this desirable? While the
regulatory hurdles to a takeover may be lowered, what about the
existing protections in place to look after vulnerable shareholders? Are
these protections part of the detailed rules that will be washed away
with the tide of regulatory reform?
This section deals with these questions. In doing so, it is apt that
we again tum to Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act, and in particular
ASIC's so-called "dispensation power," contained in§ 655A of the Act.
To begin with, some background on the dispensation power is useful.

1.

Overview ofAS/C's Dispensation Power161

The power of the corporate regulator ASIC to provide relief is said
to originally derive from the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act
1980 (Cth) ("Code"), as one of a number of important developments in
the regulation of takeovers law in Australia. The regulator at the time,
the National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC) was

161. Background derived from James McConvill & Mirko Bagaric, Opting Out of
Shareholder Governance Rights: A New Perspective on Contractual Freedom in Australian
Corporate Law, 3 DEPAUL Bus & COMM. L.J. 255 (2005). See also LEVY, supra note 102,
at 233-35.
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provided with this discretion to grant relief from the provisions of the
Code as it was readily acknowledged that many provisions in the Code
were quite complex and volatile, and strict application of the provisions
could produce unintended and undesirable consequences. Furthermore,
it was considered impossible to construct a black-letter takeovers law
which would cover all the unforeseen circumstances which arise from
takeover activity, and again ASIC's dispensation powers were
considered important here in providing for flexibility in takeovers
regulation.
Before the adoption of the Code, there was some suggestion that
Australia should adopt a "general principles" approach to national
takeovers regulation like in the United Kingdom, rather than a "black
letter law" approach like in the United States. It was ultimately settled
that a "black letter law" approach was preferable, but only on the basis
that the new regulator, the NCSC, would have discretionary power to
grant relief from the operation of the takeover provisions. In one of the
first evaluations of the 1980 Code and its provisions, Quentin Digby
wrote that:
The enactment of the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980
heralded an important development in the regulation of corporate
takeovers in Australia. The National Companies and Securities
Commission (the NCSC), which under the legislation became the
body primarily responsible for administering the Takeover Code, was
given an unprecedented level of discretionary power. The principal
discretions accorded to the NCSC empowered the Commission to
extend or reduce the coverage and effect of the Code in its application
to particular instances of takeover conduct.
... The 1980 Takeover Code represents a unique regulatory mix. As
had been the case with earlier codes, the law was spelt out in a
detailed "black letter" form. However, to introduce flexibility and to
enable enforcement of the "spirit" of the Code, wide discretions were
vested in the NCSC to modify the effect and coverage of the law. 162

Quentin Digby went on to explain that the dispensation powers
given to the NCSC in the Code ensured that there was a "commercially
realistic approach" to the operation of the Code. 163
In the High Court of Australia's decision of ASIC v DB
Management Pty Ltd and Others; Southcorp Wines Pty Ltd v DB
162. See Quentin Digby, The Principle Discretionary Powers of the National
Companies and Securities Commission Under the Takeovers Code, 3 Co. & SEC. L.J. 216,
217 (1984).
163. Id.
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Management Pty Ltd and Others, 164 a useful discussion on the origins
and rationale of ASIC's dispensation power was also provided. 165 The
Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Services Reform
Amendment Bill 2003 (Cth) also included an explanation of the origins
and rationale of ASIC's dispensation powers. 166
Since this relief power was first introduced ... it has over time been
extended to apply to many other areas of Australia's corporations law.
A similar power was considered necessary when a complicated regime
facilitating share buy-backs was introduced later in the 1980' s
(although does not operate under the present buy-back provisions in
the Act which have been significantly rationalized), and has since also
been utilized to provide for commercial flexibility in relation to the
financial reporting provisions (except the removal of auditors under
Section 329) in Part 2M, the fundraising provisions (Chapter 6D),

164. (2007) 33 A.C.S.R. 447.
165. Id. at 464. According to the Court:
Section 57 and 58 of CASA [the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980]
contained provisions corresponding to Sections 728 and 730 of the Law. Section 57
empowered the NCSC to exempt a person from compliance with all or any of the
requirements of the Code. Section 58 empowered the NCSC to declare that the
Code should have effect in its application to or in relation to a particular person or
persons in a particular case as if a provision or provisions of the Code was or were
omitted or varied or modified as specified, and 'where such a declaration is made,
the Code has effect accordingly.
This represented a legislative response to a problem of policy concerning regulation
of takeovers. It involved a compromise between the technique of general legislative
prescription applying inflexibility to all cases, and that of administrative discretion
addressing issues on a case by case basis. The NCSC was given power, not merely
to determine that, in certain cases, the legislative scheme would not apply, but also
to modify or vary the operation of the scheme . . .. It created a new set of rights and
obligations.
Id.

166. Financial Services Reform Amendment Bill 2003, Supplementary Explanatory
Memorandum,§ 3.58-3 .59 (Austl.)
ASIC uses its exemption and modification powers to provide administrative relief
from the operation of various provisions of the legislation in circumstances where it
judges that application of those provisions is not warranted, or that they should
apply in a modified way. In most situations, the exemption and modification powers
are exercised in response to requests for relief from parties who are experiencing
difficulties complying with a particular provision of the legislation or where the
application of the provisions is not appropriate in particular circumstances.
Depending on the circumstances, the strict operation of the legislation may produce
unintended or unreasonable results. Moreover, exemptions and modifications will
often be necessary to facilitate innovative products that were not contemplated at the
time the legislation was drafted, while maintaining an appropriate degree of investor
protection.
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provisions regulating managed investment schemes (Chapter 5C) and,
most recently, was incorporated as a very important component of the
financial services regime under Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act. 167

The manner in which ASIC handles application for relief from the
Corporations Act using its dispensation powers (includin~ § 655A
which provides for relief from the provisions of Chapter 6) 16 is set out
in its Policy Statement 51. 169
In my view, what is particularly significant about Policy Statement
51 is that ASIC, whether knowing it or not, adopts a standard economic
view of corporate regulation through employing a cost-benefit analysis
167. McConvill & Bargaric, supra note 161 .
Although over time the reach of the ASIC's relief powers has extended to apply to
most substantive provisions under the Corporations Act, what is very interesting is
that the powers do not apply to provisions in the Act containing important
participatory rights for shareholders, such as § 203D and the 100 member rule in §
249D(l ). This has not been an accidental omission. When one looks at the
Corporations Act in its entirety, it is quite clear that the exclusion of the ASIC's
powers of relief from these provisions is quite deliberate. For example, the ASIC is
given the power to exclude or modify the operation of particular provisions of Part
2M of the Act regulating financial reporting, however specifically excluded from
this power is the provision stating that the removal of a company's auditor(s) is to be
approved by an ordinary meeting of shareholders. Moreover, the various rights of
shareholders in relation to company meetings under Part 20.2 (e.g., the power of
100 shareholders to requisition a shareholder meeting under § 249D( 1) can be
modified, but only by the passage of Regulations under the Act, not by ASIC.

Id.
168. Section 655A of the Corporations Act provides that:
(1) ASIC may:
(a) exempt a person from a provision of this Chapter; or
(b) declare that this Chapter applies to a person as if specified provisions were
omitted, modified or varied as specified in the declaration.
Note: Under section 656A, the Panel has power to review the exercise by ASIC of
its powers under this section.
(2) In deciding whether to give the exemption or declaration, ASIC must consider
the purposes of this Chapter set out in section 602.
(3) The exemption or declaration may:
(a) apply to all or specified provisions of this Chapter; and
(b) apply to all persons, specified persons, or a specified class of
persons; and
(c) relate to all securities, specified securities or a specified class of
securities; and
(d) relate to any other matter generally or as specified.
Corporations Act, 2001, § 655A (Austl.). Under section 656A, the Panel has the power to
review the exercise by ASIC of its powers under this section. Corporations Act, 2001,§
656A (Austl.).
169. See James McConvill, Removal of Directors Takes Centre Stage in Australia: An
Exploration of the Corporate Law and Governance Issues, 1 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV.
191, 235-36 (2005) (discussing the operation of ASIC's Policy Statement 51 in relation to
applications for relief).
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to determine whether it is appropriate or not for relief from the
Corporations Act to be granted (in the form of modification or an
exemption) in each particular instance.
Applications for relief involve ASIC weighing up the regulatory
burden and commercial benefit resulting from the proposed relief being
granted. Policy Statement 51 provides that ASIC will grant relief
where:
(a) it considers that there is a net regulatory benefit; or
(b) the regulatory detriment is minimal and is clearly outweighed by
the resulting commercial benefit. 170

According to Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, ASIC's
dispensation power and policy statements comprise an "essential
supplement" to the "black letter" of the Corporations Act, Corporations
Regulations, and case law, particularly in the area of fundraising and
takeovers. 171 Although commentary and material is available to explain
how ASIC's power operates, I was quite surprised to find little in the
way of detailed exploration of the rationale for having a relief power
vested in ASIC, the desirability of the power from both a normative and
practical perspective, why the relief power only applies to specific
provisions of the Corporations Act rather than having a broad-ranging
power which applies to all the provisions of the Act, and whether a
more expansive relief power should be something to be considered.
Due to the complexities and compliance costs associated with the
financial reporting, fundraising and takeover provisions of the Act, I
understand why ASIC has been given a power to grant modifications
and exemptions for applicants in relation to these provisions, and it also
explains why applications for takeovers and fundraising relief also
forms a significant component of ASIC's work. It is quite clear that on
many occasions the regulatory detriment of granting relief is minimal
and is clearly outweighed by the commercial benefit of companies not
being faced with the commercial burden of having to comply with the
provision. 172

170. ASIC, Policy Statement 51, PS 51.44 (Sept. 14, 2006), available at
http://services.thomson.com.au/asic/ps/ps05 l.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
171. Id. at 51.3 (the "discretionary [power]" of the [Act] which are "most frequently
[exercised]" affect the provisions in the Law concerning accounts, takeovers, and
prospectuses); AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 54, at 3.141 (showing that in 2000-01, ASIC
considered 320 equity fundraising reliefapplications, and 638 takeover reliefapplications).
172. Corporations Act, 2001, § 661A. One example is relief from§ 661(A) which
essentially provides that ... if a party "and their associates have relevant interest in at least
90% ... of the securities in a company," they can acquire the remaining shares for fair
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Dispensation Power as a Mechanism for Contractual Freedom

In Part II, it was explained that central to the economic analysis of
law is the idea that the corporation is a "nexus of contracts" and that
corporate law provisions should operate as a set of "default rules" that
corporations can abide by or "opt out" of depending on whether the
affairs of the corporation can be more efficiently organized outside of
the formal regulatory regime. 173
The role of the law, therefore, is to mimic the market (for corporate
control or something else) as much as possible, so that the law becomes
an attractive product when the transaction costs of operating outside of
the formal regulatory regime become substantial.
While economic thinking is central to the theory and practice of
corporate law in the U.S., it has not assumed a significant role in
relation to corporate law in Australia. 174 But the interesting thing is that
while "law and economics" rarely forms part of the literature or
discussion on corporate law in Australia, corporate law - including the
law regulating takeovers - is structured so that, with some attention, it
can align itself quite easily with the "contractarian" model of regulation
promoted by adherents to an economic analysis of corporate law. 175
A prime example of this is ASIC's dispensation power discussed
above. This power provides an avenue for corporations to "opt out" of
formal legal rules- including the provisions in Chapter 6 which regulate
takeovers. While the dispensation power has not been considered to be
a mechanism to "opt out" of corporate law, and accommodate
"contractual freedom" in U.S. law and economic sense, it should be. 176
Undoubtedly the main reason why dispensation powers of ASIC
has not been seriously considered as a formal mechanism facilitating
opting out of corporate law is the company and its shareholders do not
have complete freedom to decide whether or not to opt out of a relevant
provision. Rather, relief is dependent on ASIC providing consent. 177
With this particular distinction in mind, "is it therefore appropriate
to classify ASIC' s relief powers as a formal mechanism in the Act

value. See e.g. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v. DB Management Pty
Ltd, (2000) 199 C.L.R. 321(Austl.). Note also that under§ 661(A)(3), a court also has the
power to change the 90% threshold. Corporations Act 2001 § 661(A)(3) (Austl.).
173. McConvill & Bagaric, supra note 161, at 270-71.
174. Id. at 256.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 269.
177. Id. at 284-85.
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facilitating opt out arrangements?" 178
A very important point to note here is that out of all the articles and
books from a number of different countries that I have read, there is
next to no reference to dispensation powers of corporate or securities
regulators as being formal mechanisms facilitating opting out. The only
discussion of the role of public regulators in the context of opting out of
corporate law was in passing, with no real acknowledgment of the
importance of this role. 179
While many countries do not have a corporate regulator similar to
the ASIC, or a corporate regulator vested with the dispensation powers
that the ASIC enjoys, many countries do - so surely there has to be a
reason why such an important aspect of corporate law has previously
not been given serious consideration when discussing opt out
arrangements.
In my opinion, undoubtedly the main reason why dispensation
powers of corporate regulators have not been seriously considered as
formal mechanisms facilitating opting out of corporate law is the
company and its shareholders do not have complete freedom to decide
whether or not to opt out of a relevant provision(s). Thus, on this view,
attaching a dispensation power to a particular provision does not alter
the mandatory nature of the provision - companies are required to
comply with the provision unless and until the regulator decides to
provide relief. In other words, the ultimate discretion as to whether or
not a company will comply or opt out of a provision is not with the
company, but with the regulator.
Accordingly, continuing this argument, there is a fundamental gulf
between traditional private ordering or 'contracting out' of a corporate
law rule by obtaining the approval of shareholders within the
corporation, and the operation of a dispensation power by the public
regulator outside of the corporation. The former involves literally
opting out of a corporate law rule, the latter does not involve opting out
of corporate law, but instead entails an alternative form of corporate law
rule - abide by the procedure of obtaining approval by the regulator to
be relieved from complying with a specific obligation or procedure in
the Act. Put simply, opting out of corporate law must be a strictly
private affair. Once there is the "public" involvement of the regulator,

178. McConvill & Bagaric, supra note 161, at 284.
179. See John C. Coffee Jr., No Exit? Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1851 (1989).
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the arrangement cannot be described as "opting out" but rather
compliance with an alternative form of corporate law rule.
In my opinion, however, this is a rather specious argument to run.
One can never truly escape corporate regulation, even if the purpose of
an arrangement or legislative initiative is to "avoid" corporate law rules.
To be able to avoid or limit the application of a corporate law rule to a
particular entity, person or circumstance itself requires some form of
consenting action for this - either through the enactment or adoption of
a legislative or executive rule authorizing this, or judicial endorsement
of a particular arrangement (e.g., ratification by shareholders of
a transaction in breach of a director's duty to avoid conflicts of interest).
Accordingly, just like an individual's "freedom" in society does
not provide a license to kill a person or steal from others, contractual
"freedom" in corporate law does not exist in a pure form. Freedom is
necessarily shaped by "boundaries." Contractual freedom in corporate
law is embraced to provide for flexibility tempered by efficiency, and
its reach therefore cannot extend to any opting out arrangements when
many of these default arrangements would be inefficient. Professor
John Coffee once wrote, in an important contribution on the judicial
role in opting out of corporate law, that the courts in the U.S. have
developed "standards" which companies endeavoring to opt out of
particular corporate law rules need to work within to prevent their
default arrangements being struck down by the court if challenged.
This constructs a boundary around the freedom that companies have to
opt out of particular corporate law rules that are enabling in nature. 180
In his article, Coffee considers the cases where courts have been
confronted with attempts to contract out of corporate law, and attempts
to understand how courts might and should respond to innovative
departures from the "traditional norms of corporate governance." The

180. See John C. Coffee, Contractual . Freedom in Corporate Law-The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1618, 1690 (1989):
If the new breed of lawyer-economists is to be listened to by courts, they must, in
tum, listen to how courts think. How then do courts think about contractual freedom
and opting out? Clearly, they do not view statutory corporate law as simply a body
of default rules, which shareholders may waive at will. Rather, courts exercise
substantial discretion to accept or reject a contractual innovation, depending upon
whether they attribute a "fat" or a "thin" policy to the statutory norm asserted to be
in conflict with the charter provision. As a statute begins to seem obsolete or
superfluous, courts have recurrently shown a willingness to shrink their conception
of its underlying policy, but only on a few occasions have courts converted a
mandatory norm into a default rule.
Id.
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article also focuses on the process of statutory interpretation and asks
when, if ever, courts should make new mandatory rules or change old
default rules. In reviewing the cases, Coffee explains that it can be seen
that the courts develop standards for opting out so that shareholders are
not able to opt out at will- and makes it clear that it cannot therefore be
said that there is complete "contractual freedom." One example Coffee
provides to support his contention is judicial decisions indicating that
the courts prefer transaction-specific modifications or exemptions from
fiduciary duties as opposed to ongoing relief. Furthermore, opting out
of fiduciary duties has always been subject to the limitation that
directors continue to meet a standard of good faith in their commercial
behavior.
In light of the above, I believe that there is no conceptual barrier to
labeling dispensation powers of a corporate regulator, as a formal
mechanism to 'opt out' of corporate law rules. There is no major
difference between a private arrangement between the company and its
shareholders or some other stakeholder which is subject to court
challenge if constructed in a manner operating outside the realm of
traditional norms of corporate governance (e.g. allowing commercial
behavior by directors which does not comply with standards of good
faith), and the power of a corporate regulator to grant an exception or
modification to a particular company from the operation of a corporate
law rule.
Both mechanisms are subject to supervision, explicitly or
implicitly, by a public body- placing limits on the discretion of the
company; both mechanisms allow for the avoidance of a corporate law
rule( s) in particular circumstances; both mechanisms are designed to
ultimately accommodate a greater sense of flexibility and efficiency in
corporate regulation (including the regulation of takeovers); and both
mechanisms are themselves constructed by a corporate law rule and
thus ultimately operate inside rather than outside the realm of corporate
law. Accordingly, if there is a general consensus that traditional private
arrangements, or "private ordering", can be said to constitute "opting
out" of corporate law, then surely it can convincingly be said that the
utilization of dispensation powers by a corporate regulator provides for
"opting out" of corporate law. 181

181. See McConvill, supra note 114 (including an extensive discussion of ASIC's
discretionary powers and the appropriateness of relating them to literature on "opt in/opt
out"). The article also includes a proposal to extend ASIC's modification and exemption
powers to remove directors. See id.
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Appreciating Real Genius: Section 611 (7)

The Marketing of§ 611 (7)

Section 655A provides for relief from Chapter 6 prov1s1ons,
including § 611 (7). It has been pointed out above that a modification of
§ 611 (7) in corporate control transactions is possible to enable
interested shareholders to vote and/or to enable the potential acquiring
company to put a resolution to target company shareholders. In this
sense, § 611 (7) seems to fit within what Bebchuk and Hamdani have
described as a "reversible default." 182
If § 611 (7) is used in this way, it provides a mechanism to bypass
the formalities of Chapter 6 unless a formal Chapter 6 bid is considered
to be in the best interests of all concerned. Modification of § 611 (7) to
facilitate this, requiring a simple application to ASIC rather than
legislative reform, simplifies takeovers regulation and makes regulation
more efficient.
This relationship between § 611(7) and § 655A needs to be better
marketed. Section 611 (7) should be promoted as a device which can be
utilized to inject greater flexibility into takeovers regulation. Section
611 (7) can achieve the flexibility and efficiency that is considered to be
lacking in Australian takeovers regulation. The task is to sell it this
way.
Section 611 (7) can make the market for corporate control in
Australia more attractive. The distortion caused by a complex and
burdensome takeovers code being imposed in a relatively small market
can be corrected through putting forward § 611 (7) as a mechanism by
which parties can be provided with greater freedom in how a particular
control transaction is to be regulated.
Importantly, there is a precedent for § 655A being utilized to
modify § 611 (7) so that it has a wider scope. While, from my research,
there has yet to be a clear example of § 611 (7) being used in the context
of a hostile takeover, there are a number of examples of ASIC granting
relief from § 611 (7) so that interested shareholders could vote.
Therefore, it is far from radical to suggest that ASIC can play a
part in injecting flexibility and efficiency into the regulation of
takeovers in Australia. It is already doing so, albeit in a rather modest
way.

182. Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 489, 493-95 (2002). A "reversible default" starts as a rule
restrictive to management, and provides shareholders with the opportunity to "opt out." Id.
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While more applications for medication of § 611 (7) could consume
the resources of ASIC, ASIC does charge a fee for each relief
application. 183 Accordingly, ASIC would generate funds from the extra
applications that could be allocated to pay for an increase in
professional and administrative staff as this was necessary to handle any
extra workload.
Importantly, viewing § 611 (7) through an economic,
"contractarian" lens not only provides for flexibility in the operation of
the Chapter 6 code, but also opens up the possibility of Chapter 6
operating as a self-contained mechanism for regulating corporate
control transactions in Australia. I have already said that schemes of
arrangement should not apply to control transactions which come under
the jurisdiction of Chapter 6. Section 611 (7) provides a way to end the
dual system of schemes and Chapter 6 bids once and for all.
At the end of the day, the transaction put to a shareholder vote
under § 611 (7) is an "arrangement", an "arrangement" that covers a host
of situations by which corporate control is transferred from one party to
another. Why then do we need a separate regime in the form of Part
5 .1, operating outside of Chapter 6, to deal with arrangements impacting
on corporate control?
The simple answer is, if § 611 (7) is capable of being modified by
ASIC to have a broad operation, we do not.
Furthermore, I believe that the application of § 611 (7) is far more
desirable than the regime regulating schemes of arrangement. All of the
commercial advantages explaining why schemes have been used for
corporate control transactions (certainty, transparency, structural
flexibility etc), can be obtained by using § 611 (7) to effect control
transactions. At the same time, all the disadvantages recognized in
using schemes (stemming mainly from the involvement at the court at
each stage, which leads to cost and time issues, but also the fact that the
scheme is an "all or nothing" chance for the acquiring company) can be
avoided.
Subject to the need to satisfy ASIC that shareholders are
sufficiently informed of the proposed acquisition, and that their rights
will not be abused, a resolution put to shareholders under § 611(7) can
be structured in whatever way the parties want, to achieve whatever
arrangement the parties desire. If it is 100% control the acquiring
company wants, this can be specified in the arrangement put to
183. See ASIC, Practice Note 58 (Jan. 13, 2006), How ASIC charges fees for relief
applications, available at http://services.thomson.corn.au/asic/pn/pno58.pdf (last visited
Nov. 30, 2006).
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shareholders for a vote. If a particular commercial or tax advantage is
sought through an acquisition, the arrangement can be structured to
achieve this outcome. If it is felt that certain shareholders should vote
separately on the transaction during to having a distinct interest in the
transaction which differs to other shareholders, the arrangement can be
designed so that shareholders vote in separate classes.
Whereas a court overseeing a scheme under Part 5 .1 tries to ensure
that shareholders are treated in a fair and reasonable manner, with a §
611 (7) arrangement, the Takeovers Panel will continue to have
jurisdiction to make a declaration of "unacceptable circumstances",
under § 657D, if shareholders are ill-treated. As was discussed in
Section three, a declaration of unacceptable circumstances can be made
if the particular transaction fails to satisfy one or more of the principles
in § 602. Whereas a court can refuse to approve a scheme, the
Takeovers Panel can make orders having the effect that the takeover
either doesn't proceed, or doesn't proceed in the manner intended.

2.

Section 611 (7) as a "Choice-Enhancing Mechanism"

Investor confidence is a crucial feature of efficient financial
markets. It facilitates attracting the capital necessary for ensuring the
liquidity required for an efficient capital market. A higher market
turnover provides a more effective price mechanism as a result of the
increased information available from increased transaction volume.
Investor protection is a significant element contributing to market
confidence. People will be less likely to invest directly in the capital
market if they perceive that they are likely to receive lower returns
because of insufficient information or a weak bargaining position. 184
As a "choice-enhancing mechanism," 185 which also has built in the
184. Australian Department of Treasury, Policy Framework, available at
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/267/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=index.asp
(last
visited Nov. 30, 2006).
185. See Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REv. 111. According to Bebchuk and Ferrell, more
choice rather than less choice in relation to takeovers regulation is to be favored. They
further argue for "choice enhancement" through two initiatives: (1) the development of a
federal law regulating takeovers in the U.S.; and (2) the introduction of a "procedural rule"
permitting unilateral action on the part of a majority of shareholders to reincorporate into the
federal takeovers law regime. See id. See also Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani,
Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk? Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters,
112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (explaining "choice enhancing"); Stephen Choi and Andrew
Guzman, Choices and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 981
(2001) ("The procedural rule advocated by Bebchuk and Ferrell consists of a mandatory
voting procedure through which a majority of shareholders . . . can choose federal takeover
rules rather than those of the State in which the corporation is incorporated. Shareholders
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regulatory protections of the antiquated scheme regime but without the
costly inefficiencies, § 611 (7) is more in line with how shareholders
would hypothetically bargain for their takeovers regulation, and
therefore is a more desirable form of regulation.
Based on economic theory, investors are more inclined to bargain
for a form of regulation which is less costly and more efficient.
According to Brian Cheffins in his excellent work Company Law:
Theory, Structure and Operation, regulation should be shaped through
hypothetical bargaining, which involves "thinking about what rational
transactors would contract for if they had perfect information, did not
face significant transaction costs, and could be fully confident that the
agreements reached would be performed as arranged." 186
According to a Nobel Prize winning theory developed by the
University of Chicago's Ronald Coase, in the absence of transaction
costs, which distort the effective operation of a particular market,
regulation shifts towards its most efficient use. 187 In The Encyclopaedia
of Law and Economics, Medema and Zerbe Jr., provide the following
useful explanation of the so-called "Coase Theorem."
Coase argued that, "from an economic perspective, the goal of the
legal system should be to establish a pattern of rights such that
economic efficiency is attained." 188

can vote in a similar way to exit the federal scheme and return to state. These votes would
be binding on the corporation.").
In the context of takeovers and shareholder empowerment, Lucian Bebchuk has also put
forward the idea of "undistorted shareholder choice," by making it necessary for hostile
bidders to win a vote of shareholder support. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973, 982 (2002) ("A voting mechanism
provides a 'clean' way of enabling shareholders to express separately their preferences [in
relation to whether a takeover should go ahead, and whether they want their shares acquired
under the takeover]."). See also Lucian Bebchuk, Towards Undistorted Choice and Equal
Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1697-98 (1985) ("According to
the undistorted choice objective, a target should be acquired if and only if its shareholders,
or at least shareholders holding a majority of its shares, judge the offer acquisition price to
be higher than the independent target's value.").
186. BRIAN CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 264
(Oxford University Press 1997).
187. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960);
available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/socrates/coase.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (discussing
the Coase Theorem: "in a world where there are no transaction costs, an efficient outcome
will occur regardless of the initial allocation of property rights.").
188. STEVEN G. MEDEMA & RICHARD 0. ZERBE JNR., The Coase Theorem, in THE
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 836 (Gerrit de Geest & Boudewijn Boukaert, eds.
2000).
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There are two general claims about outcomes which represent the
Coase Theorem.
The first is that, regardless of how rights are initially assigned, the
resulting allocation of resources will be efficient. This proposition the "efficiency hypothesis" - is reflected in all statements of the
Theorem. The second claim, which is not reflected in all statements of
the Theorem, is that the final allocation of resources will be invariant
under alternative assignment of rights. 189

Coase believed that government's role is to eliminate or at least
reduce transaction costs, where these are present, through the use of
regulation. Transaction cost economics is all about what kinds of
initiatives (such as firms or markets) will minimize the transaction costs
of producing and distributing a particular good or service. 190
When transaction costs - that is, the costs involved in an economic
exchange - are present, as they are in the market for corporate control,
the most effective approach to regulation is to try and reduce the
transaction costs so that the market is more efficient. But at the same
time, an unfettered market is not desirable if lack of investor confidence
due to poor protection hampers efficiency.
The elevation of § 611 (7), in the manner outlined above, is
designed to provide an option to choose an approach to the regulation of
a takeover which reduces transaction costs involved in the alternative
options of schemes of arrangement or a full-scale Chapter 6 takeover
bid, but still imbedding the protections of these regimes. As a product
in the market for corporate control, fresh thinking about § 611 (7) makes
takeovers regulation more attractive, and sets in place a product strategy
which should have the effect of increasing consumer demand for the
189. Id. at 838. Medema and Zerbe Jnr. provide an explanation of the Coase Theorem
from a non-cooperative game perspective:
The initial assignment of rights establishes the utility level of each player in the
absence of further reallocations of resources and there are assumed to exist
reallocations of resources which are efficiency enhancing, in the sense that the
utility of one player can be increased without reducing the utility of the other player.
However, neither party will agree to an alteration in the allocation of resources
unless that reallocation increases its utility.
Id. at 852.
190. See Wikipedia, Coase Theorem, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coase_theorem (last
visited Nov. 30, 2006)
[T]he theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs, all government
allocations of property are equally efficient, because interested parties will bargain
privately to correct any extemality. As a corollary, this theorem also implies that in
the presence of transaction costs, government may minimize inefficiency by
allocating property initially to the party assigning it the greatest utility.
Id.
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product.
It is for this reason that the ideas outlined in this article should be
given serious attention going forward.
CONCLUSION

The market for corporate control has been recognized as one of the
primary mechanisms operating to ensure that directors and managers
remain accountable to shareholders, and that the interests of
management and shareholders are aligned.
Takeovers law is a product offered in this market, a product which
can be effective in promoting efficiency by way of building investor
confidence, but which can be a burden if the law distorts the operation
of the market.
The manner in which takeovers law should be structured, and the
considerations which should guide its development, has been a major
issue since the 1980s.
Takeovers law has been a primary area of focus among
commentators interested in the economic analysis of law in general, and
corporate law in particular. As has been discussed in this article,
economic analysis of takeovers law raises questions about whether
mandatory rules have a place at all in the market for corporate control.
While economic analysis of law, including takeovers law, has been
prominent in the United States and some European countries, it has yet
to be really embraced in Australia.
In this article, I have argued that it is time for this to change.
Economic analysis has much to offer. In this article, I have perceived
takeovers law as a product in a market, just like a pair of glasses or a
candy bar. I suggested that in Australia this product, in its present form,
is not being marketed effectively to highlight the genius of the product.
It was explained that Australian takeovers law can facilitate the
flexibility and efficiency that economic analysis suggests is central to an
effective program of takeovers regulation. This does not require law
reform. Rather, it was argued that takeovers law, as a product in the
market for corporate control, can be reinvigorated through the
application of basic principles of marketing.
A "product management" approach to takeovers law can change in
a fundamental way how takeovers are regulated in Australia, without a
drop of legislative ink.
The end result of this product management approach is that the
dual system of schemes of arrangement and formal Chapter 6 bids,
which the market for corporate control in Australia presently endures,
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would end.
Contrary to what some commentators have recently proposed, I
believe that schemes of arrangement can, and should, be removed from
the takeovers regime in Australia through effective marketing of one
little-known provision in Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act: § 611 (7).
This article explained this can be achieved. The challenge now is to put
the vision in this article into practice.
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